TRANSACTIONS OF SECTION F. 907 
But to the economists of to-day the whole question appears both more complex 
and more important than it seemed to their predecessors, so they are inquiring in 
detail how far it is true that the looser forms of combination are specially 
dangerous in spite of their weakness, and even to some extent because of their 
weakness ; how far the greater stability and publicity, and sense of responsibility 
and slowness of growth, of a single consolidated firm make it less likely to extend 
its operations over a very wide area, and less likely to make a flagrantly bad use 
of its power ; and, lastly, how far it may be expedient to prohibit actions on the 
part of loose combinations, while similar actions on the part of individuals and 
private firms are allowed to pass in silence, because no prohibition against them 
could be effectual. 
It is a sign of the times that the American Senate approved, on April 8 last, a 
Bill of Senator Sherman’s, of which the second Section begins thus: ‘ Kvery person 
who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise, or conspire with any other person 
or persons to monopolise, any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour.’ This 
clause is interesting to the constitutional lawyer on account of the skill with which 
it avoids any interference by the central authority with the internal affairs of the 
separate States; and though, partly for this reason, it is perhaps intended to be 
the expression of a sentiment that may help to guide public opinion, rather than an 
enactment which will bear much direct fruit; yet it is of great interest to the 
economist as showing atendency toextend to the action of individuals a form of public 
criticism which has hitherto been almost confined to the action of combinations. 
To return, then, to the tendency of Trusts towards consolidation. It is probable 
that the special legislative influences by which it has been promoted may be 
lessened, but that other causes will remain sufficiently strong to make a combina- 
tion, which has once got so far as any sort of permanent pooling, tend almost 
irresistibly towards the more compact unity of a joint-stock company. If this be 
so, the new movement will go more nearly on old lines than at one time 
seemed probable; and the question will still be the old one of the struggle for 
victory on the one hand between large firms and small firms, and on the other 
between departments of the Government, imperial or local, and private firms. I 
will then pass to consider the modern aspects of this question, ever old and ever 
new, but never more new and never more urgent than to-day. 
§ 11. To begin with, it is now universally recognised that there is a great in- 
crease in the number and importance of a class of industries, which are often 
called monopolies, but which are perhaps better described as indivisible industries. 
Such are the industries that supply gas or water in any given area, for only one 
such company in any district can be given leave to pull up the streets. Almost on 
the same footing are railways, tramways, electricity supply companies, and many 
others. Now, though there are some little differences of opinion among the 
economists of to-day as to the scale on which the owners of such undertakings 
when in private hands should be compensated for interference with what they had 
thought their vested rights, we are all agreed that such right of interference must 
be absolute, and the economists of to-day are eagerly inquiring what form it is most 
expedient for this interference to take. And here differences of opinion show 
themselves. The advantages of a bureaucratic government appeal strongly to 
some classes of minds, among whom are to be included many German economists 
and a few of the younger American economists who have been much under 
German influence. But those in whom the Anglo-Saxon spirit is strongest, would 
prefer that such undertakings, though always under public control, and sometimes 
even in public ownership, should whenever possible be worked and managed by 
private corporations. We (for I would here include myself) believe that bureau- 
cratic management is less suitable for Anglo-Saxons than for other races who are 
more patient and more easily contented, more submissive and less full of initiative, 
who like to take things easily and to spread their work out rather thinly over 
long hours. An Englishman’s or an American’s life would involve too much strain 
to make them happy, while the Englishman would fret under the constraints and the 
small economies of their lives. Without therefore expressing any opinion as to 
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