igo UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO STUDIES 



fixed by its projection into space, just as our constantly changing 

 impressions take on the definite outlines and immobility of the 

 external object which is their cause. We distort the feelings of 

 immediate consciousness as soon as we distinguish a 

 Association numerical multipUcity in their confused mass. The 

 Explain Only feeHng lives because the duration in which it develops 

 Our Superficial is a duration whose moments interpenetrate. On the 



Conscious r • i. i. 1_ ^l. 1 r • 



g surface, our conscious states obey the laws of associa- 



tion, but deeper down they interpenetrate and form a part 

 of ourselves. When we break up the elements of an idea, and think 

 that the separated parts are the genuine threads of the idea; when 

 we substitute for the interpenetration of the real terms the juxta- 

 position of the symbols, we claim to make duration out of space and 

 we fall into the mistakes of associationism. The duration which 

 the deep-seated conscious states create is a duration whose moments 

 do not constitute a numerical multipUcity. 



The subject of free will brings into question the two rival systems 

 of mechanism and dynamism. There are two kinds of determinism — 

 physical and psychological; the former is reducible to the latter, and 

 it rests on an inaccurate conception of the multiplicity of conscious 

 states, or duration. To prove conscious states determined, we should 

 have to show a connection between them and cerebral states, and 

 Bergson tells us that there is no such proof. When we assume 

 physical determinism to be universal, we also postulate psychological 



. „. . determinism. The determinist, deceived by a wrong 

 A Thorough- . , , . , ,. , , , , , 



going Associa- conception of duration and causality, holds that the 



tionism Must determination of conscious states is absolute. This 



Deny Free jg ^jjg origin of associative determinism. The principle 



of the conservation of energy is not universally valid, 



because it impHes that a system can return to its original state, thus 



neglecting duration; hence it is not applicable to living beings and 



conscious states. The belief in the conservation theory is rooted in 



the fact that inert matter does not seem to endure or preserve any 



traces of past time. But in the realm of Ufe, duration seems to act 



like a cause, and the idea of putting things back in their places is 



