BERGSON S CONCEPTION OF DURATION I99 



absurd when applied to living beings. "Such being the case, is 



there not much to be said for the hypothesis of a conscious force, or 



free will, which, subject to the action of time and storing 



™"^„ 1 up duration, may thereby escape the law of the con- 

 Will Be Pre- ^ . ->,, ^1 -T r 1 

 cisely the Ex- servation of energy ? The idea of the universality 



ception to the of conservation of energy depends upon a confusion 

 Law of the Con-^^g^^ggj^ concrete duration and abstract time. We are 

 Enerey? ^^^ *^ beUeve that the real duration hved by conscious- 



ness is the same as the duration which passes over inert 

 matter without penetrating it or altering it, because we observe 

 ourselves through these forms borrowed from the external world. If 

 we set up the principle of conservation of energy as universal, we 

 identify true duration with apparent duration. 



Psychological determinism depends on an associationist conception 

 of mind; but associationism involves a false conception of the self, 

 and fails to distinguish between the multiplicity of 

 In Great Crises jy^^gj^jQj^ and that of fusion. A certain feeling, or 

 Our Decisions : . . , ^ . , ,. , . 



Are Free and ^'^^3., contains an mdeiimte plurahty of conscious states, 



Not Deter- but this plurality is not noticed unless it is spread out in 

 mined by ^jjg homogeneous medium which some call duration, but 



tions which is really space. Associationism does not explain 



the deeper self; it is an inaccurate psychology, misled by 

 language, and only our everyday acts obey the laws of association. 

 At great crises, our decisions are really free, and express the deeper self. 

 The error of determinism is based on a misconception of duration. 



Suppose I hesitate between two possible actions, X and Y. My 

 mental states may be divided into two groups, one inclined toward X, 

 All Accounts of *-^^ other toward Y. "These opposite inclinations are 

 Acts of WUl two symbols by which I represent at their arrival, or 

 Deal with the termination-points, so to speak, two different tendencies 

 R^^ lt*° f WUl °^ ^^ personahty at successive moments of duration." 

 ing and Not The living activity of the self in which we distinguish by 

 with the Living abstraction two opposite tendencies will finally issue 

 Process either at X or Y. If this symbolism represents the 



facts, the activity of the self has always tended in one direction, and 



