CONTINUITY OF BERGSON S THOUGHT 1 59 



ception of causation, and to see that in no sense in which we 

 use the word to denote the regular successions of science can it be 

 applied to the obscure and incalculable movements of our deeper 

 selves. Therefore, we may justly conclude that no one who really 

 comprehends the true nature of time, or duration, can doubt the freedom 

 of the will. 



This conclusion, published in 1889, marks the first stage of impor- 

 tance in the history of Bergson's thought. It will appear farther on 

 that all his later views depend upon this conception of time, in a very 

 real and direct connection. 



A quarter of a century has elapsed since Bergson in his Doctor's 

 thesis established the "new idealism" and "discovered the soul." 

 There is nothing in his later works that equals the depth and the 

 originality of his first great thought. In this conception of time as 

 the purely spiritual element in the world, he surpasses Kant more 

 completely than Kant "sublated" Locke and Leibniz. It is no longer 

 "time and space," but time versus space. His system stands or falls 

 on the strictness of his conception of time as "duration." The seed 

 of his work on "Matter and Memory" has been exhibited in the fore- 

 going pages, but the very last chapter of his illustrious views on 

 "Creative Evolution" is equally based upon the great thought which 

 he expounds in his publication of 1889. 



Most of the criticisms (in learned and popular periodicals) of 

 Bergson's philosophy are based upon a misreading of his "Creative 

 Evolution"; but this work cannot be understood or answered without 

 a thorough comprehension of his use of such words as "duration," 

 "will," "memory," "matter," "space"; and when the chaotic dis- 

 cussion of his system has cleared, we shall learn whether his "dura- 

 tionism" can be really subverted. 



The preliminary to any future criticism of Bergson should be a few 

 convincing paragraphs as to what he teaches concerning those things 

 which exist in a manner proper to the psychic state. Is it too much 

 to say that none of the able writers who have refuted him have shown 

 that they have quite caught his argument? 



