CONTINUITY OF BERGSON's THOUGHT 169 



III. Creative Evolution 



In the Preface Bergson speaks of his general position — that intel- 

 lect is only an aspect of life, and (as found in man) not broad enough 

 to explain life, especially as it ignores so much of life in ignoring all 

 the experience of inferior species, which have, so to speak, fallen 

 behind us in the race. 



The first chapter begins with a reiteration of Bergson's favorite 

 idea of duration. We endure, but external objects are always in the 

 last analysis unchangeable. The final elements of things (molecules, 

 atoms, corpuscles) can "return"; they have no real history or develop- 

 ment; they do not profit by experience, and thus invent new phases, 

 (in contrast to "us"); a "sufficient" scientist could foretell the posi- 

 tion of every single atom. Mathematics and physics disregard true 

 duration; their symbol "t" always deals with breaks, not intervals. 

 The universe as a whole endures and creates new and unexpected and 

 even unimaginable things, like the mind itself. Duration means just 

 invention or creation. In the universe we may conceive of two oppo- 

 site movements, matter descending and life struggling upward: life 

 endures, and imposes its own rhythm upon matter. The universe is 

 a boundless ocean of vibrations, most of which are colorless and non- 

 existent for the individual : but out of this ocean the individual selects 

 as much as it may possibly act upon, and by a synthesis in accordance 

 with his own rhythm, the individual, so to speak, paints his own world 

 on the larger but neglected background. We cut out our own systems; 

 we see only the plan or design of our own action. We thus flash out 

 isolated groups which, without our reaction, fade back into the color- 

 less whole. These groups must be conceived as possessing true duration 

 in the whole of nature, but not in the isolated systems, in which we see 

 them, and which are only snap-shots of reality, constructed to satisfy our 

 practical needs. 



Now the question arises whether a living organism like a lifeless 

 object is also a mere snap-shot devoid of duration. Bergson says, 

 "No." A living body grows old, has a real history, cannot "return" 

 to earlier states, is strictly individual. Of course it is impossible to 

 define the word individual very closely, but a living organism seems to 



