CONTINUITY OF BERGSON S THOUGHT 195 



reality, and is only a useful part of the intellectual hypothesis of 

 mechanism. 



Some of the modern European systems have taken the idea that 

 creation arises out of "nothing" seriously. After admitting that in 

 the beginning there is "nothing," they try to reconcile with this void 

 state the idea that all things exist in the idea of a possible existence, 

 and proceed to develop out of a mere abstract, logical possibility the 

 reality of an evolving world, at a sacrifice of all common-sense. 



But the mistake is in the easy assumption that they really do think 

 back to "nothing." 



What are we thinking about, when we speak of "nothing"? 

 Modern psychology demands that the world should correspond in 

 some way to an image, but to an image of what ? But a more pre- 

 tentious philosophy will attempt to show that it corresponds to an 

 idea without corresponding to any image. Let us examine "nothing" 

 with reference to each of these views. 



On the first count, we finally reach the conclusion that if we imagine 

 a negative we are really imagining that which makes the image nega- 

 tive; and that something still subsists. It even seems probable that 

 in trying to imagine nothing we imagine with unusual vividness both 

 an outer and an inner reality. 



On the second count, we find that the "idea" of "nothing" is an 

 idea of substitution; and that in addition this substitution is tinged 

 by a feeling (as of regret or disappointment) . "Nothing " is therefore 

 neither an image nor an idea, but a pseudo-idea, a mere word. We 

 cannot be called upon to explain why creation arises out of "nothing," 

 because for duration there simply is not (and cannot be) any true 

 meaning assignable to the word "nothing." 



This obsession of practical intelligence about "nothing" is persist- 

 ent, and the mode of intellect makes it both persistent and natural. 

 All statical processes of thought, however subtle, neglect the real 

 curves of living, mobile reality, treating polygons as circles, assuming 

 that points make lines, and surfaces solids; but these methods do 

 not quite reach the truth about reality: between these states are 

 states of "nothing," but both the states and the "nothings" between 



