124 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO STUDIES 



immortality of the soul. As a starting-point for our discussion thereof 

 we should have before us the conception of the soul that our writers 

 unite in combating, and we may quote it from Haeckel: "The pre- 

 vaihng conception of the psychic activity, which we contest, con 

 siders soul and body to be two distinct entities. These two entities 

 can exist independently of each other; there is no intrinsic necessity 

 for their union. The organized body is a mortal, material nature, 

 chemically composed of hving protoplasm and its compounds. The 

 soul, on the other hand, is an immortal, immaterial being, a spiritual 

 agent whose activity is entirely incomprehensible to us."' To this 

 conception our authors are radically opposed. They both hold that 

 the soul has no existence apart from the body, and is therefore mortal. 

 They differ from each other in that Haeckel regards the soul as merely 

 a psychic activity, while Lucretius in his excessive refining thinks 

 of it as an entity within the body. This difference, however, may 

 be practically neglected when you read the reiterated statement of 

 Lucretius that "the mind and soul are kept together and make up 

 a single nature."^ "Do you mind to link to one name both of them 

 alike; and when, for instance, I shall choose to speak of the soul, 

 showing it to be mortal, believe that I speak of the mind as well, inas- 

 much as both make up one thing and are one united substance P"^ 

 Both insist that all psychic activities, like all other phenomena, have 

 a material basis. By Haeckel this is called psychoplasm — "a body 

 of the group we call protoplasmic bodies, the albuminoid carbon com- 

 binations, which are at the root of all vital processes."'* By Lucretius 

 it is said to be "seeds exceedingly round and exceedingly minute 

 in order to be stirred and set in motion by a small moving power, "s 

 It is hardly necessary to point out that this divergence is a matter of 

 chemical and physiological advance rather than a real difference of 

 position. 



With this statement of their general conception of the soul before 

 us we shall easily understand their attitude and arguments, and it 



'WR., 80-90. 3 De R. N., Ill, 421-424. 



' De R. N., III. 136-137- " WR., 90-91. 



5 De R. N., Ill, 186-188. We need not concern ourselves with his rather metaphysical attempt to sub- 

 diWde this nature. (See III, 231 seq.) 



