Meeting of the Estates-General, 1789. Loe 
vagabond agitators probably account for the outbreak, Maleissye 
and Besenval lay the responsibility for the whole affair upon 
‘the Duc d’Orléans. Maleissye’s theory was that the duke had 
the insurrection staged to test the loyalty of the troops, especially 
of the French Guards. Since they showed practically no signs 
of defection, the Duc d’Orléans, through his agents, entered 
upon a systematic course of seduction.*? The degree of the 
duke’s guilt is problematical, although, of course, the support 
of popular opinion in Paris, without the backing of the French 
Guards would avail him nothing in furthering the schemes he 
was believed to cherish. As a matter of fact, the Duc d’Orléans 
appears to have been the dupe of a group of unscrupulous indi- 
viduals like Choderdos de Laclos, who made use of the Orleanists’ 
desire for revenge and the widespread hatred of the queen and 
court to further schemes of their own.*t The duke’s intimate 
association with such characters and his huge fortune naturally 
awakened the suspicion that he paid for the defection of the 
French Guards. 
Wine, women, and money were designated as the means 
employed to break down the discipline and undermine the loyalty 
of the guards. On the other hand, the circumstances noted 
above, without any additional cause in the form of bribes sup- 
plied by the Duc d’Orleans, would explain the adhesion of the 
French Guards to the revolution.* Yet it is a well-known fact 
that reputed agents of the Duc d’Orléans, especially M. de 
Valady, appeared in the quarters of the soldiers. M. de Valady 
was a former officer of the French guards who, it is said, left 
the service to escape a dishonorable dismissal. According to 
contemporaries, he had no visible source of income, but seemed 
to be rolling in wealth and went among the soldiers distributing 
40 Besenval, II, 348; Maleissye, 10-11, 15, 21-22. 
41 Rouff, ‘‘ Le peuple ouvrier de Paris au 30 juin et 30 aout 1789,” in La 
rév. francaise, LXIII, 439-441. 
# Besenval, II, 358; Maleissye, 19. 
48 Flammermont, ‘‘ Les gardes frangaises en juillet 1789,”’ La rév fran- 
¢adise, XXXVI, 12-24. Flammermont shows by copious quotations from 
contemporary writers, among others, from the Duc de Chatelet himself, that 
the French Guards were not an undisciplined, immoral force, open to bribery 
or ready to engage in any sort of disorder. 
245 
