The Theory of Greek Tragedy 31 
he does what seems good in his own eyes. That he would do 
right, is sentimentally a mitigating circumstance; his crime is that 
he would do right wilfully and after his own mind. That he 
happens to right a wrong, to anticipate a reform—that he is the 
noblest of rebels, makes the demoralization of his example no 
less—rather the greater. Nor does it affect the issue particularly 
that his rebellion is directed against a tentative and imperfect 
administration. What administration is otherwise? 
The illustration may seem far fetched; but I never read the 
Prometheus that I am not reminded of a pensée of Pascal’s. 
It is proper to observe right; it is necessary to observe might. Right 
without might is powerless; might without right is tyrannical. Right 
without might is disputed, because there are always the wicked; might 
without right is reviled. It is necessary, therefore, to unite right and 
might, and for that purpose to make right mighty or might right. 
But right is subject to dispute; might is easily recognizable and is indis- 
putable. Hence it is impossible to annex might to right, because might has 
contradicted and asserted that she alone is right. And so, since it is 
impossible to make right mighty, we have made might right. 
Not that this conception answers exactly to Aeschylus’ whole 
thought. What Pascal regards as a permanent state of affairs, 
Aeschylus contemplates as a transient condition, a mere Durch- 
gangspunkt. But Pascal’s notion is true enough for the moment 
marked by the Prometheus Bound. In order that justice may be 
ultimately ensured, it is necessary first to found a power capable 
of maintaining some sort of order and discipline, from which by 
a process of gradual correction and improvement may be devel- 
oped a more and more perfect justice, in which the rights of 
humanity itself shall receive their proper recognition. Such is 
apparently the condition on which Zeus is suffered to reign; he 
too must adjust himself to a higher principle than his own con- 
veniency. For the correction and perfection, as for the main- 
tenance, of that moral order to which the obedience of inferior 
beings is due, Zeus himself is answerable to the fate which pal- 
pably overhangs him throughout the tragedy. He must reconcile 
himself with Prometheus, he must find a modus vivendi with the 
champion of mankind, which has its rightful place also in the 
universal polity—before his sovereignty is confirmed. If the 
329 
