24 Frederick Warren Sanford 



practice of alternation of fasces can not be used as a basis for 

 distributing the months between the two consuls. 



But there is very good reason for thinking that Caesar arrived 

 in Italy earlier than November 25. Marcellus's proposal to turn 

 the two legions against Caesar is said by Appian to have been 

 inspired by a false rumor that Caesar had crossed the Alps and 

 was marching on the city.''* The latter half of the rumor was 

 certainly false. Curio's denunciation of the report need refer to 

 this second part only. But it is quite possible that Caesar came 

 into Italy earlier than November 25 by a week or more, as will 

 appear later. It is credible also that the government party was 

 watching Caesar's movements and was quickly informed of his 

 presence in Cisalpine Gaul. If, in addition, the fact that a part 

 of the army was on its way to the Aeduan country after the re- 

 view, or had already arrived there, became known in northern 

 Italy at the time of Caesar's coming, it may have been converted 

 into the rumor that the entire army was marching to attack the 

 city. On this hypothesis Caesar would have reached Italy at 

 least nine or ten days before the date at which Pompeius received 

 his commission, as early as November 20 or 21, the latest pos- 

 sible date of that event being December 2. This hypothesis would 

 compel us to adopt the first of the alternative explanations of quo 

 cum venissct given above. There is further evidence for this 

 explanation. 



In ^. G., VIII, 52, 4 fit'., Hirtius seeks to justify the equanimity 

 with which Caesar, in the period following the review of his army, 

 received reports of his enemies' endeavors to tamper with La- 

 bienus's loyalty, and mentions one attempt in particular which 

 Curio made to secure a decree of the senate ordering both Pom- 

 peius and Caesar to give up their armies. Hirtius might be ex- 

 pected to cite the most impressive incident of the kind, one in 

 which a vote was taken, if possible, and in consequence the vote 

 of 370 to 22 in favor of the disarmament of the two rivals, which 

 left no doubt of the senate's aversion to civil war, and which could 

 well have been regarded as reassuring to Caesar.^^ It would 



"5. C, II, 31; cf. Plut., Pomp. 58. 

 **App., B. C, II, 30; Plut., Pomp. 58. 



316 



