PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON. 49 



arise as soon as we go beyond those mental states which communi- 

 cate themselves to the senses of others. 



We now see that in order to communicate to our foreigner a 

 knowledge of language, we must follow rules similar to those ne- 

 cessary for the stability of a building. The foundation of the build- 

 ing must be well laid upon objects knowable by his five senses. Of 

 course the mind, as well as the external object, may be a factor in 

 determining the ideas which the words are intended to express ; but 

 this does not in any manner invalidate the conditions which we im- 

 pose. Whatever theory we may adopt of the relative part played 

 by the knowing subject, and the external object in the acquirement 

 of knowledge, it remains none the less true that no knowledge of 

 the meaning of a word can be acquired except through the senses, 

 and that the meaning is, therefore, limited by the senses. If we 

 transgress the rule of founding each meaning upon meanings below 

 it, and having the whole ultimately resting upon a sensuous founda- 

 tion, we at once branch off into sound without sense. We may 

 teach him the use of an extended vocabulary, to the terms of which 

 he may apply ideas of his own, more or less vague, but there will 

 be no way of deciding that he attaches the same meaning to these 

 terms that we do. 



What we have shown true of an intelligent foreigner is neces- 

 sarily true of the growing man. We come into the world with- 

 out a knowledge of the meaning of words, and can acquire such 

 knowledge only by a process which we have found applicable to 

 the intelligent foreigner. But to confine ourselves within these 

 limits in the use of language requires a course of severe mental dis- 

 cipline. The transgression of the rule will naturally seem to the 

 undisciplined mind a mark of intellectual vigor rather than the re- 

 verse. In our system of education every temptation is held out to 

 the learner to transgress the rule by the fluent use of language to 

 which it is doubtful if he himself attaches clear notions, and which 

 he can never be certain suggests to his hearer the ideas which he 

 intends. Indeed, we not infrequently see, even among practical 

 educators, expressions of positive antipathy to scientific precision of 

 language so obviously opposed to good sense that they can. be 

 attributed only to a failure to comprehend the meaning of the lan- 

 guage which they criticise. 



Perhaps the most injurious effect in this direction arises from 

 the natural tendency of the mind, when not subject to a scientific 

 4 



