50 BULLETIN OF THE 



discipline, to think of words expressing sensible objects and their 

 relations as connoting certain supersensuous attributes. This is fre- 

 quently seen in the repugnance of the metaphysical mind to receive 

 a scientific statement about a matter of fact simply as a matter of 

 fact. This repugnance does not generally arise in respect to the 

 every day matters of life. When we say that the earth is round 

 we state a truth which every one is willing to receive as final. If 

 without denying that the earth was round, one should criticise the 

 statement on the ground that it was not necessarily round but 

 might be of some other form, we should simply smile at this use of 

 language. But when we take a more general statement and assert 

 that the laws of nature are inexorable, and that all phenomona, 

 so far as we can show, occur in obedience to their requirements, we 

 are met with a sort of criticism with which all of us are familiar, 

 and which I am unable adequately to describe. No one denies 

 that as a matter of fact, and as far as his experience extends, these 

 laws do appear to be inexorable. I have never heard of any one 

 professing, during the present generation, to describe a natural 

 phenomenon, with the avowed belief that it was not a product of 

 natural law ; yet we constantly hear the scientific view criticised on 

 the ground that events may occur without being subject to natural 

 law. The word " may," in this connection, is one to which we can 

 attach no meaning expressive of a sensuous relation. 



This is, however, not the most frequent misuse of the word may. 

 In fact, the unscientific use of language to which I refer, is most 

 strongly shown in disquisitions on the freedom of the will. When 

 I say that it is perfectly certain that I will to-morrow perform a 

 certain act unless some cause external to my mind which I do not 

 now foresee occurs to prevent me, I make a statement which is final 

 so far as scientific ideas are concerned. But it will sometimes be 

 maintained that however certain it may be that I shall perform 

 this act, nevertheless I may act otherwise. All I can say to this is 

 that I do not understand the meaning of the statement. 



The analogous conflict between the scientific use of language and 

 the use made by some philosophers, is found in connection with 

 the idea of causation. Fundamentally the word cause is used 

 in scientific language in the same sense as in the language of com- 

 mon life. When we discuss with our neighbors the cause of a fit 

 of illness, of a fire, or of cold weather, not the slightest ambiguity 

 attaches to the use of the word, because whatever meaning may 



