PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON. 157 



in violation of the canons of sound thought, and is contradictory 

 of one of the most obvious aphorisms of logical metaphysics. What- 

 ever our refinements as to the real nature of physical contact (it 

 is said), this action is none the less a fact of constant and familiar 

 occurrence, and is the actual method of kinetic transference mani- 

 fested to our every-day observation. If we wish to give a billiard 

 ball a definite motion in a specific direction, we do not whistle to 

 the ball, or attempt to " psychologize " it ; we strike it with a cue. 

 Is it conceivable that " mere brute matter" should be more " spirit- 

 ual " than man himself? 



As these popular and taking propositions involve purely a ques- 

 tion of physical fact, their truth can never be decided by any 

 introspections of the consciousness, by any deductions from the 

 " ego cogito," or by any disquisitions on " the theory of conception." 

 As a question of fact, the final settlement of the nature of material 

 action is to be reached only by the converging inductions of a 

 critical experience (aided and enlightened by every expedient of re- 

 fined investigation), and by the necessary inferences from such 

 experience. It is very certain that a material body must exert its 

 action — either at some distance, or at no distance, that is by abso- 

 lute and perfect contact. Have we at present the means of intelli- 

 gently probing this sharply defined issue ? * 



Action at no Distance. — It is a well-established principle, or rather 

 fact, of dynamics that finite time is required for the production of 



where it is not. '" (L. E. D. Phil. Mag. December, 1867: vol. xxxiv, 

 p. 450.) And George Henry Leaves is fully persuaded that " Action at 

 a distance (unless understood in the sense of action through unspecified in- 

 termediates) is both logically and physically absurd." (Problems of Life 

 and Mind. 1875: vol. II, appendix C, p. 484.) 



*Dr. Oliver J. Lodge has remarked: " I venture to think that putting 

 metaphysics entirely on one side we may prove in a perfectly simple and 

 physical manner that it is impossible for two bodies not in contact to act 

 directly on each other : " and he defends the position by the argument, that 

 since action and re-action are equal and opposite, and since " work " done 

 upon one body is equal to the " energy " so expended by the opposite body, 

 " the distances must be equal but not opposite ; that is, the two bodies must 

 move over precisely the same distance and in the same sense : which practi- 

 cally asserts that they move together and are in contact so long as the 

 action is going on." (L. E. D. Phil. Mag. January, 1881 : vol. xi, pp. 

 36, 37.) 



