6 Laura B. Pfciffcr 



ment of his promises depend upon his own good will. Undis- 

 mayed hy the display of force made hy the government, the com- 

 mons disoheyed the king's orders to separate, persisted in their 

 previous decrees, and protected their members by a declaration 

 of inviolability. Being impressed by the sturdy attitude of the 

 commons and influenced by the public agitation in Paris and Ver- 

 sailles, the king, unwilling at this time to use force, brought about 

 the union of the three orders on June 27. 



But this act in no sense marked the reconciliation of the king 

 with the new order of things. His attitude became more aggress- 

 ive and the appeal to force, not made on the 23d of June, was 

 attempted the second week in July, when the uprising of Paris 

 and the fall of the Bastille forced the king to withdraw the troops 

 from Paris and Versailles and to recognize the supremacy of the 

 assembly." 



Having failed in this appeal to force, the resistance to the new 

 order of things on the part of the king now assumed a more passive 

 form. The new policy was shown in his attitude toward such acts 

 of the assembly as required his sanction to give them the force of 

 law. He delayed the promulgation of the 4th of August decrees, 

 making them public only under the most extreme pressure from 

 the assembly. He followed the same policy of procrastination 

 in accepting the declaration of rights and the articles of the con- 

 stitution, declining to approve them unless the executive power 

 were left absolutely in the hands of the monarch.® 



The calling of the regiment of Flanders was looked upon by the 

 people of Paris as an attempt on the part of the king to maintain 

 his position in opposition to all influence that might be brought to 

 bear by the populace of Paris. It was even thought that the regi- 

 ment was to be used to cover his flight, if that became necessary. 

 The banquet of the bodyguard at Versailles served to strengthen 

 this belief and led to the uprising of October 5. 



^ Caron, "La tentative de contre-revolution de juin-juillet 1789," in 

 Revue d'liisioire niodenic, VIII, 5-34, 64<>-78; Flammcrmont, Lc 14 jiiillet 

 17S9. 



* Stoddard, " The Causes of the Insurrection of the 5th and 6th of 

 October," 23-25. 



202 



