C8 Charles Kuhlmann 



Club relative to the gathering of troops about Versailles 

 and Paris, but the attitude and fears of the deputies of 

 Bretagne are clearly expressed in their correspondence 

 both before and after the insurrection of Paris. ^ It seemed 

 now as if the Kevolution would be forced to abandon its 

 program or to maintain itself by force of arms. To the 

 Breton deputies, the contemplation of such alternatives 

 was not new. The same, in effect, had faced the Third 

 Estate in Bretagne a few months before, according to 

 their belief, with the result that a militia was formed for 

 the protection of the provincial reform movement. In 

 Bretagne, the danger of the use of force against the es- 

 tates had always been so keenly felt that the liberties of 

 the assembly were deemed menaced if troops were brought 

 within ten leagues of its meeting place.- In the cahicrs 

 of Ilennes, the crisis of July had been foreseen as a pos- 

 sibility, for in article 51 it is declared that "The troops 

 belong to the nation, so that they can not, without ren- 

 dering themselves guilty of rebellion, favor the violation 

 of the constitution or the national laws, and particularly 

 the encroachment upon the liberties of the assemblies of 

 the States General and of the provinces, in preventing 

 their formation, assembling, or in effecting their disper- 

 sion.^ 



Three prominent members of the Breton Club, Sieyes, 

 Le Chapelier, and Gregoire seconded Mirabeau's motion 

 of July 8 asldng the king for the withdrawal of the 

 troops. * Numerous passages in the letters of the deputies 

 show that they would as individuals not have hesitated 



'See the letters of Boulle, June 24, 26, 28, July 7, and of Le Roulx, 

 July 11 and 17. 



-Point du Jour, I, No. XIX, p. 143. Remarks of Siey6s on the mo- 

 tion of Mirabeau for the withdrawal of the troops. 



^Archives Naiionales Ba26, liasse 170i"s. 



*Pomt du Jour, I, No. XIX, pp. 143, 144. 



274 



