Blasius. } 214 | Dec. 7, 1877. 
of high barometer or an anti-cyclone. Captain Ryan was, therefore, jus- 
tified in starting to sea in accordance with the present navigation rules de- 
duced from the generally accepted theory. 
In my work, ‘‘Storms, their Nature. Classification and Laws’’ (pub- 
lished two years ago), I think I have demonstrated that this old theory is 
wrong and worse than useless, that it is illusive and mischievous, and leads 
often into danger instead of out of it. I showed that the area of low pres- 
sure or low barometer is not the storm, but only the effect of the storm, 
and that the progressive storms (the equatorial and polar storms) of the 
temperate zone, with which we have principally to deal, consist of two 
areas of high barometer or rather of two erial currents of different direc- 
tion and temperature, which, so to speak, create the area of low barometer 
between them, by the obliquely upward flowing of the warmer current 
over the face of the colder. Whether the storm, 7. ¢., this system of two 
opposing currents of different temperature which displace each other, 
comes over us with falling or rising barometer depends entirely upon the 
kind of storm, the state of its development and the position we are in to- 
wards these three parts of the storm, facts about which the clouds and the 
direction of the wind give trustworthy information. The barometer is, 
therefore, unreliable. 
To illustrate this important matter I showed that the heaviest rains and 
most destructive storms had passed for two days during their earlier devel- 
opment in the form of high pressure through the jurisdiction of the Sig- 
nal Service Bureau without being recognized as storms, until arriving at 
the coast—as for instance, the Nova Scotia storm, 1873—they destroyed over 
a thousand vessels and six hundred lives in almost a single night. 
The fact that the barometer stood above the mean height is, therefore, an 
explanation of why the Huron sailed notwithstanding the Signal Service 
warnings, but why should she hug the coast? In the absence of the 
commander the most that can be offered is a plausible conjecture, but it 
seems probable that his action in this respect was in the belief that this 
was the safest course for him to take, a belief founded on the rules issued 
by the Navy Department for maneuvering in such cases. 
These ‘‘ Nautical Rules’’ instruct the navigator that in storms or cyclones 
the ‘‘manageable semicircle”’ is on the left side of the path of the centre, 
?.é., in storms traveling up the Atlantic coast the ‘‘manageable semicircle”’ 
is on the coast side of the storm, and the ‘‘ dangerous semicircle’ out at 
sea. And therefore, according to these rules issued for his instruction and 
guidance, Commander Ryan did perfectly right to keep to the coast so as 
to be in the ‘‘manageable semicircle ’’ of the cyclone. He had to select 
between two evils—the ‘‘dangerous semicircle’’ and the coast. Had he gone 
out to sea he would have come in the ‘‘dangerous semicircle’’ and dis- 
obeyed these published rules of his department, although as the sequel 
shows he would have saved himself, crew and ship. These ‘‘ Nautical 
Rules’ are founded on the dicta of the most eminent meteorological au- 
thorities, and strictly in accordance with the science as it now stands, but 
