: TRANSACTIONS OF THE SECTIONS. 161 
as Cavalry and Artillery, as well as those circumstances that render the subsistence 
of large armies difficult or impossible. In the second case all inequalities of the 
ground, however slight, the nature of the soil and the effect which rain has upon 
it, the extent and character of the vegetation and cultivation, and all buildings, 
whether isolated or collected into towns and villages, are of more or less 
a peti 
The climate of the theatre of war must always have an important influence on 
military operations, and should be the subject of careful study. Our own experience 
in the Crimea shows how much suffering may be caused by want of forethought in 
this respect. General Verevkin’s remarkable march of more than a thousand miles, 
from Orenburg to Khiva, with the thermometer ranging from —24° to 100°, without 
the loss of a man, shows what may be accomplished with due preparation. Nor 
should the geological structure of a country be overlooked in its influence on the 
varied forms which the earth’s crust assumes, on the presence or otherwise of 
“water, on the supply of metal for repairing roads, and (if we may trust somewhat 
similar appearances on the Gold Coast, at Hong Kong, and in the Seychelles) on 
the healthiness or unhealthiness of the climate. 
In any campaign undertaken by England, the sea must always play an im- 
portant part as the great base of operations and main line of communication with 
the mother country. Special consideration must be given to the facilities which 
the coast-line of the theatre of war offers for effecting a landing ; to the anchorages, 
shoals, roads, inlets, harbours, and depth of water along the coast ; to the influence 
of the winds, tides, and currents on the entrance to harbours; to the nature of the 
mouths of rivers; and to the time, force, and duration of periodical storms, and 
their effect on navigation. 
A general knowledge of the geography and topography of a country is, however, 
in itself insufficient for military purposes ; it is necessary, in addition, to know the 
present state of roads and bridges, the depth and width of streams, the state of the 
soil and of its cultivation &c., and especially the best means of turning the ground to 
account for the object in view. This information is obtained by what are called 
Military Reconnaissances. 
It is scarcely necessary to remind you that though mountain-ranges and rivers 
materially affect the operations of war, they are by no means insurmountable ~ 
obstacles. The Alps have been repeatedly crossed since the days of Hannibal; 
Wellington crossed the Pyrenees in spite of the opposition of Soult, Diebitsch the 
Balkan though defended by the Turks; and Pollock forced his way through the 
dreaded Kyber ; whilst there is hardly a river in the length and breadth of Kurope 
that has not been crossed even when the passage has been ably disputed. Soult 
escaping from Wellington over the Sierra de Catalina by a smuggler’s path, 
Ochterlony penetrating into the heart of the Goorkha country by a wild mountain 
track, the rear divisions of Napoleon’s army at Leipsic sacrificed from a neglect to 
reconnoitre the Elster, show how close the examination of a country should be. 
This is, however, hardly the place, nor would there be time, to discuss the minuter 
details of military geography and topography ; they will be found in the works 
especially devoted to the subject. 
Queen Elizabeth’s minister was right when he said that “ knowledge is power ;” 
and a knowledge of the physical features of a country, combined with a just appre- 
ciation of their influence on military operations, is a very great power in war. A 
commander entering upon a campaign without such knowledge may be likened to 
a man groping in the dark; with it he may act with a boldness and decision that 
will often ensure success. It was this class of knowledge, possessed in the highest 
degree by all great commanders, that enabled Jomini to foretell the collision of the 
French and Prussian armies at Jena in 1807, and in later years enabled a Prussian 
officer, when told that MacMahon had marched northwards from Chalons, to ie 
unerringly to Sedan as the place where the decisive battle would be fought. Chief 
Justice Daly, in his address to the American Geographical Society, drafvs attention 
to the Franco-German War as “ a war fought as much by maps as by weapons,” 
and attributes the result to “skilful military movements, performed by an army 
thoroughly acquainted with all the geographical features of the country over which 
it was moved ;” and, he adds, “ It teaches us thatif the fate of anation may depend 
upon a battle, a battle may depend on a knowledge of geography.” 
1874 12 
