TMANSACTIONS OF SECTION F. 645 



published, I shall dwell at some length on the several grounds of his censures, 

 stating and illustrating them in my own way, which will differ considerably from 

 the mode of treatment which they received in the controversy to which I have 

 referred. Those grounds, though nowhere by him formally enumerated, are essen- 

 tially reducible to four, having relation — first, to the attempt to isolate the study 

 of the facts of wealth from that of the other social phenomena ; secondly, to the 

 metaphysical or viciously abstract character of many of the conceptions of the 

 economists ; thirdly, to the abusive preponderance of deduction in their processes 

 of research ; and fourthly, to the too absolute way in which their conclusions are 

 conceived and enunciated. It will be found that these heads cannot be kept strictly 

 apart, but run into each other at several points. The separation of them will, 

 however, serve to give distinctness and order to the discussion. 



I. The first objection is, as I have stated, to the pretension of the economists to 

 isolate the special phenomena they study, the economic phenomena of society, from 

 all the rest— its material aspect from its intellectual, moral, and political aspects, 

 and to constitute an independent science, dealing with the former alone, to the 

 exclusion of the latter. This question as to the relation of economic studies to the 

 general body of human knowledge, is really the most radical and vital that can be 

 raised respecting them, and on it more than on any other depends, in my opinion, 

 the future of these studies. 



It is sometimes sought to get rid of this question in a very summary manner, 

 and to represent those who raise it either as weakly sentimental persons, who shrink 

 from studying the conditions of wealth apart, because there are better and higher 

 things than wealth ; or as persons of confused intellect, who wish to mix together 

 things which are essentially different in their nature. On the former of these im- 

 putations it is unnecessary to dwell. I am far from undervaluing sentiment in its 

 proper sphere ; but I take up no sentimental ground on the present question. In 

 denying the propriety of isolating economic investigation, I appeal to considerations 

 derived from the philosophy of science. The second allegation is, therefore, the only 

 one with which I am now concerned. 



_ In a recent elementary treatise on political economy, by a well-known writer, 

 it is argued: — "We must do one thing at a time; we cannot learn the social 

 sciences all at the same time. No one objects to astronomy that it treats only of 

 the stars, or to mathematics that it treats only of numbers and quantities. . . There 

 must be many physical sciences, and there must be also many social sciences, and 

 each of these sciences must treat of its own proper subject, and not of things in 

 general." 



But a little consideration will show that these remarks touch only the outside 

 of the question. Of course we must do only one thing at a time. Only one out of 

 several branches of a subject can be considered at a time ; but they are yet branches 

 of a single subject, and the relations of the branches may be precisely the most 

 important thing to be kept in view respecting them. It might be said : " It is 

 important, no doubt, that plant life and animal life should both be understood ; 

 but zoology and botany are different sciences ; let them be studied apart ; let a 

 separate class of savants be appropriated to each, and every essential end is secured." 

 But what says Professor Huxley, in unison with all the most competent opinion on 

 the subject ? — " The study of living bodies is really one discipline, which is divided 

 into zoology and botany simply as a matter of convenience." They are, in fact, 

 branches from the common stem of Biology, and neither can be rightly conceived 

 without bearing this in mind. Now I maintain that for still stronger reasons the 

 several branches of social science must be kept in the closest relation. 



Another biological analogy will place these reasons in the clearest light. When 

 we pass from the study of the inorganic world to that of the organic, which pre- 

 supposes and succeeds to the former, we come upon the new idea of a living whole, 

 with definite structures appropriated to special actions, but all influencing one 

 another, and co-operating to one result— the healthy life of the organism. Here, 

 then, it is plain that we cannot isolate the study of one organ from that of the rest, 

 or of the whole. We cannot break up the study of the human body into a number 

 of different sciences, dealing respectively with the different organs and functions, 



