Ta 
1903.] STONEY—UNIVERSE OF REAL EXISTENCES. 111 
against falling into mistakes between the various shades of meaning 
which the poverty of language obliges us to put up with in such 
terms as existence, theory, actual, real, etc. If in any context we 
have occasion to employ any of these terms in more than one of its 
permissible meanings, it may sometimes be advisable to distinguish 
between them in some such way as that which is familiar to mathe- 
maticians when they write a, a’, a’, etc., for different quantities. 
Availing ourselves of this device, we may write [real], within square 
brackets, when we wish to make it explicit that the word is to be 
understood in its absolute, that is in its autic, sense; and [real], 
with a dash, when the word is used in its objective, which is it 
principal relative, sense ; while [real]”, [real ]’”, etc., may be used to 
signify the other relative meanings which the term has when used in 
subordination to more limited hypotheses, as when we describe the 
rays of Geometrical Optics as being some of them [real]” and others 
virtual. The same treatment may be extended to any other terms 
that seem to require the precaution. It is against mistakes between 
the odjective and the auzic significations of words that we have to be 
most on our guard. ‘This will become clearer as we proceed. 
CHAPTER 4. Or AUTA: AND OF THE MEANING TO BE ATTRIBUTED 
TO THE WorD Zofality. 
It may be seen from the foregoing pages that the human mind 
is better fitted to cope with the scientific study of what apparently 
occurs in nature, than with the attempt to penetrate behind nature 
to the causes of these appearances. To do this requires us to 
inquire what has been happening in the universe of real existences, 
and to endeavor to determine what those existences are. 
In the scientific study of nature we travel along one of the great 
highways of human thought; in ontology we have to make our 
roads as well as to push our way along them. It is therefore all 
the more important that we should bring to our aid every help 
which the scientific study of nature can supply. The present essay 
is an attempt to avail ourselves of this assistance. 
Let us for convenience call the real existences aufa (ta dvta atta) 
—the very things themselves. An auto, then, is a thing that really 
exists, and in no wise depends on the way we—human minds— 
may happen to regard it. Our impressions or beliefs about it may 
be correct or may be erroneous, but the term auto means the thing 
ttself. 
