' 
114 STONEY—UNIVERSE OF REAL EXISTENCES.  [April3, 
include it; but the supposition is true, and therefore unobjection- 
able, and it is introduced thus early because without it we should 
be obliged to use unfamiliar forms of expression which would be 
less perspicuous. 
With the same end in view, viz., to attain lucidity, the language 
of causation is freely used throughout the essay, but will be found 
not to involve anything beyond what is included in the fifth of our 
postulates until we enter on the consideration of ‘‘ efficient ’’’ causes. 
CHAPTER 7. Or Ecorstic AUTA, AND OF SENSE-COMPELLING 
AUTA. 
My own thoughts are, at all events, things that exist (Postulates 
1 and 2): they at least are auta so long as they last. They are, 
accordingly, while they last, a part of the universe of existing 
things. But they are not the whole of that universe. In the first 
place, the thoughts of other men and the thoughts of the lower 
animals are also things that exist (Postulate 4). And beside all 
these auta there are also auta of the kind that produce effects 
within men’s minds through their [organs of sense]* (Postulate 5). 
This is a complete enumeration of auta—things that exist—so far 
as known to man. 
The minds of my fellow-men and the minds of the lower animals 
may conveniently be classed along with my mind as ¢he egotstic 
part of the universe—being the part of the universe which I am 
already in a position to know consists of auta of the same kind as 
those that make up the ego. 
Auta of the other kind we may provisionally speak of as sezse- 
compelling auta, in contradistinction to my mind and the minds of 
other men and animals, which are groups of auta that receive cer- 
tain definite additions when and so long as our [organs of sense] 
are forced into action by sense-compelling auta. The totality of 
these sense-compelling auta we may, for brevity, designate she 
1 By [organs of sense], within square brackets, are to be understood the real 
existences, the antitheta in the autic universe, which cause in us those percep- 
tions which when synthetized furnish the phenomenal objects to which the term 
organs of sense is also applicable, and which, when we have occasion to distin- 
guish them from their antitheta, may be written [organs of sense]’, with a dash. 
The antitheta are popularly imagined to be « material substances’ of the phe- 
nomenal objects: but this conception of them conveys an entirely erroneous 
ilea, as will appear in the sequel. See also Chapter 4, above. 
