118 STONEY—UNIVERSE OF REAL EXISTENCES. [April 3, 
The group of auta which includes the auta that make up the mind 
along with those that make up its synergos, is the true existence in 
the autic universe which corresponds to that natural object which 
we call the brain. The prevalent belief that the true existence is 
a ‘material substance’ hovering about that portion of space within 
which the phenomenal object appears to be situated, is an utter mis- 
take, although it is a belief which has been handed down to us by 
generations of our predecessors, and in which we were all brought 
up. Numberless are the errors which have crystallized about the 
phrase ‘material substance’; and the mischief that has been 
wrought by them may be judged from the circumstance that they 
have quite shut out of view the wonderful capabilities of the true 
autic existences, of which we get one very instructive glimpse when 
we find that the thoughts that are our mind are a small—a very 
small— part of one of them. 
Superstance would be a less misleading term than substance ; but 
it is better to cut ourselves completely adrift from all the mislead- 
ing associations bound up with the word substance. When the rela- 
tion between a natural object and its autic cause is under consider- 
ation, the present writer has found it convenient to speak of the 
natural object as the frothefon and the autic cause in the sense- 
compelling universe as its aztitheton. Using this nomenclature, 
the drain of a man is a protheton, and his mnd + synergos are its 
antitheton. The mind -synergos are a part of the true autic 
universe: the brain is a part of that hypotheton which we call 
nature.’ 
With this imperfect treatment of the subject we must be content 
1 The labors of physiologists lead to the conclusion that no thought becomes a 
part of the mind of any animal without being accompanied by some change in 
its brain, using the word brain here to mean, not the onto-brain but the objective 
brain, which is a part of nature. These objective changes are motions of some 
kind Hence we find here an instance in which the autic anthitheta of certain 
motions are thoughts. 
The above relation is often so stated as to imply that the change in the brain 
is in some way the cause of the thought. This is to mistake the weather-cock for 
the wind. What occurs in the autic universe is the cause of the appearance of 
change in nature, and not vice versé. 
Nevertheless it is legitimate for physiologists to work, as they usually do, under 
the Ayfothesis that it is the objective events that cause the autic; provided that 
they do not make the mistake of supposing that this interchange between cause 
and effect is theory. 
