1903.] STONEY—-UNIVERSE OF REAL EXISTENCES. 119 
until we can resume the discussion with the advantage of having 
learned what a natural object is, and what space relations are. 
CHAPTER 10. Or PERCEPTIONS. 
The tekmeria, the messages from abroad, as I experience them 
when an auto acts on me through my [senses], are more than mere 
sensations. ‘To enable me to see this it is only necessary for me to 
direct my attention to the remarkable judgments about space rela- 
tions which have annexed themselves to, and in some cases even 
substituted themselves for, my sensations. When I hurt my foot 
and when I hurt my elbow there is a difference in the sensations ; 
and this difference my mind, largely assisted by the synergos,’ has 
come to translate into the perception of a space relation between 
these two sensations, and between them and others. Thus the first 
pain is felt as a pain in the foot, z.¢., 7 or about a certain position 
in space; the second pain I similarly /ocadize. So also with other 
sensations when they have come to be transformed into perceptions. 
The red which I now see in each coal of the fire is a sensation 
which seems to me of a certain shape and size, and at a certain 
distance from muscular sensations which I feel at the same time, 
viz.: the sensation of turning my head towards the fire, of con- 
verging my eyes in succession upon different parts of it, the sensa- 
tion of now and then winking, and the sensation of making and 
maintaining the focal adjustment of my eyes: all of which latter 
1 The physiological view of these events would be somewhat as follows: the 
hurt foot and the hurt elbow are in communication with different regions of the 
brain, and the [effects ]/ produced in the brain are not the same in the two cases, 
Although part of these effects are the protheton of the thought in the mind, much 
more of them are the protheton of changes in the synergos; for, whatever the 
change in the brain has been, it #zzs¢ have included a body of molecular events 
and others with time-relations too rapidly varying to be the protheton of any such 
slowly changing auto as a human thought. These accordingly are part of the 
protheton of the synergos, since the brain as a whole is the protheton of that 
group of auta which includes both the thoughts that are the mind and those other 
auta that’ are the synergos. And as the more slowly changing events in the 
brain and those that change more rapidly are so interdependent that neither can 
be other than it is, without its affecting the other, so are the thoughts in the 
mind and the autic events in the synergos interwoven and they affect each other. 
It would also appear that in dreamless sleep, those special slower events spoken 
of above cease to occur within the brain. But some, at least, of the swifter ones 
are still present, so that at such times the whole antitheton of the objective brain 
consists of the synergos only. 
