2 Roscoe Pound 



in a country dominated by philosophical methods. Hence its 

 methods are philosophical as well as historical. The English 

 Historical School arose by way of revolt from a predominant 

 analytical school. Hence its methods are comparative and his- 

 torical, and the representatives of this school have regarded them 

 as supplementary to analytical methods rather than as self-suffi- 

 cient. 1 On the other hand, the influence of this revolt has given 

 the recent analytical jurists a strong historical bent; while in 

 Germany the rise of legislation, instead of creating an analytical 

 school, has merely given an analytical turn to jurists who must 

 still be counted either as philosophical or as historical. More- 

 over, the Philosophical School, except in Scotland and in Italy, 

 its present stronghold, has almost turned historical. 2 



We should naturally expect a new school to emerge from this 

 breakdown of the older schools, and there are many signs that 

 such an event is in progress. Jurists are coming together upon 

 a new ground from many different starting points. Some of 

 them profess to find this new ground, potentially at least, in the 

 schools from which they set out. But there is much to indicate 

 that, instead of a further variation of one of the old creeds, an 

 entirely new creed is to be looked for. The rising and still form- 

 ative school, to which we must look henceforth for advance in 

 juristic thought, may be styled the Sociological School. 



The first movement in the new direction was from the then 

 dominant historical school in Germany. The historical school 

 began by applying historical method to the modern Roman law. 

 Next we see a tendency to investigate the legal institutions of 

 all Aryan peoples and reconstruct an Aryan Urreclit, in which 

 the roots of modern law were to be found. 3 Presently, while the 

 latter movement was in progress, the scope of inquiry was 

 widened, an ethnological turn was given to historical jurispru- 

 dence, and the foundations of what Kohler styles universal legal 

 history (Universalrcchtsgeschichtc) began to be laid. At first 

 this wider historical jurisprudence was thought of as a com- 



1 Maine, Ancient Law, 7; Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, 2, 

 8 Prina; La Philosophic du droit etficole historique, 8. 

 3 The best examples are: Leist, Altarisches Jus Gentium "(1889) and All- 

 arisches Jus Civile (1892). 



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