26 Colorado College Studies. 



of Mill differs from that of Bacon, in being based upon a dyna- 

 mic instead of a static conception of the universe, upon the law 

 of causation instead of the principle of forms; but, on the other 

 hand, both in its general spirit and in the special provision for 

 "rejections and exclusions" embodied in the four experimental 

 methods, it incorporates the essential part of Bacon's reform. 



We have seen that the first effort to discriminate a valuable 

 from valueless forms of inductive inference was made by- 

 Socrates. His dialectic was an attack upon the ideas which 

 had grown up in men's minds as a result of uncritical general- 

 ization; what he condemned was the habit of leaping to an 

 inductive conclusion, which is thenceforth held, untested by 

 comparison with fact, as a permanent part of our mental furni- 

 ture. 



In Bacon's theory this element of negative criticism became 

 of overshadowing importance. The participation of the imagi- 

 nation in the search after truth was reduced to insignificance, 

 and inductive investigation became a simple process of boiling 

 down facts for their solid residuum. 



In the theory of "VVhewell the inductive guess received 

 recognition as a necessary part of the normal process. Ac- 

 cording to modern views therefore true induction involves both 

 that action of the mind in leaping to a conclusion which when 

 it acts alone leads to the false and prejudiced notions which 

 both Socrates and Bacon combated; and a testing of this sug- 

 gestion by its confrontation with further fact obtained by 

 observation or experiment. 



The contribution of Mill to the discussion of Inductive 

 inference embraced an elaborate theory of its validity. This 

 he made to depend chiefly .on the law of Causation and the 

 principle of Natural Kinds; although he admitted that some 

 slight independent foundation is given an inductive conclusion 

 by purely mathematical considerations of Probability. 



