22 Colorado College Studies. 



time for contemporary opinion to work upon the majority and 

 perhaps check its action. It is no small matter to lose these 

 benefits. Yet under the present system the incompatibility of 

 majority and minority rights is real, in a demoralized House. 

 There must be some limit of frequency to the obstructive powers 

 of the minority; and if the limit is applied by the majority, it 

 will be used too often, and most sharply used at just the times 

 when it ought not to be used at all. 



The root of the trouble is that the majority controls the 

 limit of frequency. If the control can be lodged elsewhere, the 

 minority can perhaps be restored to usefulness without recover- 

 ing power for mischief. To give control to the Speaker is a mere 

 formal change, unless the speakership were made non-partisan. 

 To create a separate officer of the House, to decide when the 

 minority can properly use dilatory powers, is similarly imprac- 

 ticable. But there is another resource — the rules themselves. 

 If the minority can be given some effectual right, to be used only 

 a certain number of times, the limit is assured, and the minority 

 itself can be left to choose the critical moments for using the 



right. 



III. 



Suppose a rule of the House giving to six or seven members 

 of the minority each an absolute right to demand, twice during 

 his term, four hours' speaking for his own side, Avith the privi- 

 lege of naming the members to use the time, while the Speaker 

 retains power to lengthen the debate by recognizing other mem- 

 bers. A right to propose three amendments and require a vote 

 on them might well be added. The members to be armed with 

 these exceptional rights could be chosen by mere written nomi- 

 nation, (any twenty members naming one), or they could be 

 officers of the House elected under a minority-representation 

 rule of ballot. In either case the majority would have the same 

 privilege, in name, without motive to use it. 



The minority would then have half a dozen responsible men, 

 chosen by their own caucus, able to secure in all, during the two 



