Protection of Congressional Minorities. 23 



years, about fifty hours of debate at the most useful times; an 

 allowance small enough to discourage waste of it, and large 

 enough to give opportunity for a conspicuous protest against a 

 dozen of the bills most objectionable to the minority. Each use 

 of such a power would itself call public attention to the protest. 

 At other times the majority would retain its present powers of 

 forcing business forward rapidly. The right to legislate and the 

 right to protest would no longer be incompatible. 



It remains to provide means for saving the other function of 

 a minority, of forcing the majority sometimes to halt long 

 enough for adverse public opinion to act. Most of the bills 

 beaten in that way are really bad. Mere tiring out the majority 

 has no like claim to approval, and we need not regret seeing it 

 made difficult. But most of the true virtue of delaj^ by obstruc- 

 tion can be kept when general obstruction is abolished. Suppose, 

 again, that each member who carries the special right to claim 

 debate is further privileged once in his term to postpone arbi- 

 trarily for two weeks the final vote on passage of a bill ( or of a 

 resolution changing the rules or unseating a member); no repe- 

 tition of the postponement admissible. The chance of an exer- 

 cise of this right in the last two weeks of a session would put 

 no unjust hardship on the majority; they must bring partisan 

 measures to a vote before the last fortnight, or obtain a two- 

 thirds vote to suspend the rules afterwards. The postponed 

 bill could meanwhile (by a slight change of Senate rules) be 

 considered by the Senate, go through conference committee, be 

 passed by the Senate, and return to the House to await its fate 

 on the postponed vote. But this is not an essential change; 

 the bill could be left absolutely suspended through the fort- 

 night. 



The minority could thus take a fortnight's grace on six or 

 seven important measures within two years, for the sake of 

 bringing outside pressure to bear on the majority; and would do 

 it without wasting any time of the House. 



