0)1 Two Passages in the Crifo. 85 



Crito to either take new ground or let him alone. In his own 

 mind, of course, the latter is the real goal and Tyler evidently 

 recognized this in his explanation of the MS. reading; but it is 

 only an inference from the whole passage, not a meaning to be 

 taken directly from the Greek; indeed that this was his real 

 aim become clear only as the argument proceeds. Every doubt 

 of his object vanishes when the last words of the dialogue are- 

 reached, in which he tells Crito that the voice which hums in 

 his ears prevents him from hearing anj^ other and that it will 

 be useless for him to say anything more. 



fj.ij 1)0 OzTj v-()?.oyi':^s(j>'hx'. dot si ^/rr»^i'/)jVx£:v oz't -aitaiii'jo'^raq yjA 

 r^ao/.io:^ aytiyTO.:^ oots a/.Xo ortoov T:d(T%.et'^ ~/)d rob ao'.xzi'j. 



This passage occurs in -48 D, just above the one already con- 

 sidered. Most of the editors with Stallbaum place a comma 

 after ayir^ra:; wliich has the effect of making -i)d mb ao'./.-'.-j depend 

 upon -da-x,z>.'j. Some of the recent editors omit the comma and 

 thus allow the -pu rob ddr/.zv^ to go back in thought to the o-o- 

 kuyilza^'ya'. where it logically belongs as can readily be seen from 

 the context. The burden of his entire argument is that they 

 must consider first the question as to whether they are doing 

 right or wrong and everything else must give way to this. We 

 have here then, as often in Plato, a condensed expression such 

 as is quite characteristic of Socrates who seems to delight in 

 " cutting across lots." It stands for something like this; i>.t, 



DO uirj b-DXiiyiXsai^fa'. dot el d-Di'^rj(T/.siv d-l -ujiaiiho'/Taq xai ijijoy.ia^ 

 ayo'^Tu: dots ua/jj oTiDbv Tzdax^etv ~fjv tdo b~DADyi'^zai'}at ei doi/.tl.' osT 

 r, iJ-f]. 



The commentators, so far as I have been able to consult 

 them, seem to regard the -in, Tab dur/.zv^ as depending upon 

 -«<7;5£!i/, which involves a logical contradiction, perhaps too subtle 

 to be noticed by the casual observer; but still a clear logical 

 contradiction of his position; for it makes his say; " we must 

 not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in 

 prison and keep quiet, nor whether we must suffer any thing 



