1909.] FULLERTON— DARWIN AND MENTAL SCIENCES. xxxiii 



field. We cannot refuse to acknowledge it; it only remains for us to 

 ask ourselves in what spirit we will admit it and adjust ourselves 

 to it. 



It is notorious that Darwin's work aroused serious apprehension 

 and even bitter opposition on the part of many good people in his 

 own time. It would be wrong for me not to dwell upon both 

 aspects of the doctrine of the evolution of man and of human 

 society, for both are actually of lively interest to those busied with 

 the mental and moral sciences. The two aspects to which I allude are 

 these: On the one hand, in treating man as a natural phenomenon, 

 an explicable thing, we seem to be gaining much for science ; on the 

 other hand, in placing him in nature as a part of nature, we appear 

 to degrade him from the high estate which the beliefs of the past 

 have assigned to him — to make him, not a little lower than the 

 angels, but a little higher than the brutes. I cannot refuse to discuss 

 these things, for have I not contrasted rather sharply the mental 

 and moral sciences as they were, and the same sciences as they are 

 now, painting in no neutral colors the character of the modern in- 

 vestigator? It may fairly be asked whether the portrait is not too 

 highly colored. Are there not those now busied with the study of 

 man, in one or another of its aspects, who give but a qualified 

 assent to the doctrine of evolution as it is coming to be accepted by 

 many of their colleagues? 



Let us dwell, first, for a few moments upon what men of the 

 most diverse opinions must recognize as the attractive aspect of the 

 •doctrine. The idea of evolution has unquestionably proved a valu- 

 able instrument of investigation in every science which busies itself 

 with man. Whatever mental reservations the man of science may 

 cherish, whatever the limits which he may be inclined to set to 

 evolution, he actually appeals to the principle in the interpretation 

 of concrete facts. He finds that, in the light of it, the mind of 

 man, his opinions, his emotions, his aesthetic judgments, his ethical 

 codes, his social institutions — everything becomes luminous with a 

 new significance. 



Moreover, with an increase in comprehension comes a broader 

 .and a more intelligent sympathy. At any stage of his progress 



PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC. XLVIII. I9I C*, PRINTED JULY 7, I9O9. 



