The Counter Revolution of June-July 27 



these instructions could be given by the bailUages to their repre- 

 sentatives ; the first form could not be used because deputies were 

 " sent to deliberate and there is no deliberation when the vote is 

 prescribed. Moreover, although I think that an imperative man- 

 date is against principle and reason, I avow frankly that I would 

 not regard that form of instructions with as much rigor as the 

 others, especially for a first meeting of the states-general where 

 the citizens, in order to insure their rights, saw nothing fixed 

 except by an imperious and absolute wish." The second form was 

 " without effect and is null for, through silence, a bearer of a man- 

 date can not reduce the other agents to inaction and when the other 

 bailliages deliberate it is a right even a duty for the interest of the 

 bailliage to deliberate also." The third kind of imperative in- 

 structions was the worst of all for it " announced a schism, a de- 

 sire contrary to all the other bailliages and it substituted a par- 

 ticular wish for the general desire. . . . To those who may insist 

 that imperative instructions bind the assembly, suspend its activity, 

 so that it can not deliberate I reply ; first, that all opinion com- 

 manded by a bailliage is a forced opinion, and that if the assembly 

 is not free as to the end it should be as to the means ; second, that 

 in every case, in every circumstance, the deputies of the bailliages 

 should deliberate because they are censurable, if they do not exer- 

 cise their right to deliberate when the other bailliages deliberate; 

 third, that the order to retire is^also censurable since it expresses 

 the desire to withdraw from the decision of the assembly. ... I 

 firmly believe that the deputies are bound by such mandates. I do 

 not allow myself to be led by the opinion that it is through force, 

 by constraint that they have submitted to imperative instructions 

 and that it is in some way, in spite of the cry of their conscience 

 that they have submitted to these laws. I do not see in that en- 

 gagement an immoral action. The deputy certainly can say, ' I 

 shall not deliberate on such a subject'; he can promise it and his 

 promise can be received; there is no law which prevents this 

 social compact and nothing is more sacred than when the religion 

 of the promise is joined to the religion of the oath. But are there, 

 in reality, any imperative instructions? Has not an anxious 

 scruple given to a simple indicative instruction the appearance of 



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