1900.] HASTINGS—POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. 315 
of the police power, or as the employment of a subordinate author- 
ity in the states to legislate upon interstate and foreign commerce in 
fields where Congress had not yet entered, was here a little varied. 
The question here was whether the police power of the states was a 
distinct and exclusive or a related one and concurrent with that of 
Congress over fugitive slaves. 
After discussing unsatisfactory results that might ensue if the 
states were not permitted to legislate in certain ways as to fugitive 
slaves the Chief Justice says, 
“Tt seems supposed that laws nearly similar to those I have mentioned 
might be passed by the state by virtue of her powers over her internal 
police, and by virtue of her right to remove from her territory disorderly 
PEISONS: 45. o- . But it would be difficult, perhaps, to bring all the laws I 
have mentioned within the legitimate scope of the internal powers of 
BOGE. oc) se It has not heretofore been supposed necessary in order to 
justify these laws to refer them to such questionable powers of internal 
and local police.’ ! 
Judge Thompson concurred in thinking state legislation neces- 
sary sometimes and proper when not contradictory of the acts of 
Congress or the federal constitution, but he enters upon no dis- 
cussion of the relations of the subject to police power. Judge 
Wayne held the opposite view with a like silence except to deny all 
right of legislation over this subject to the states except such ‘‘as 
may be of a strictly police character.’’ Justice Daniel followed on 
the other side with numerous citations from City of New York vs. 
Miln and free use of the term police power, and calls attention to 
the fact that dealing with the fugitive, merely as such, so long as 
he neither disturbs or threatens the domestic tranquility, is a matter 
of foreign relations and not of police: 
‘Under such circumstances he would not be a proper subject for the ex- 
ertion of police power. If not challenged under a different power of the 
state, his escape would be inevitable.’’? 
If arrested by the exercise of the police power he would, as far as 
he was subjected to that power of the state, ‘‘ be taken out of that 
of his master,’’ and thus the invocation of this police power, so far 
from securing the rights of the master, would ‘‘ be made an engine 
to insure the deprivation of his property.’’ 
Justice McLean in his turn takes up the controversy in such 
1 76 Peters, 632-3. * Td, 658. 
PROC. AMER. PHILOS. SOC. XXXIX. 163. Y. PRINTED SEPT. 22, 1900. 
