414 HASTINGS—POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. [June 19, 
terms it is also to be presumed that mere general provisions as to 
personal or property rights were not intended to affect them. 
In all these earlier cases the legislative authority is, as before sug- 
gested, rarely attacked. The question debated and passed upon is 
more frequently the extent to which that authority has been, or is 
intended to be, exercised in the given case. And it is further to 
_be observed that none of them use the term “ police power.”’ 
They talk about ‘‘ Power to make police regulations,’’ ‘‘ Control 
of matters of internal police’’ and use the phrases we found in the 
federal cases before that of the City of New York vs. Miln. The 
first state case found in a somewhat extended examination to use 
the term ‘‘ police power’’ in the court’s opinion is ‘Jones vs. 
The People, in Illinois in 1852 by Judge Trumbull. 
He holds that the passage of a prohibitory law to prevent all sale 
of ardent spirits except for medical, mechanical and sacramental 
purposes is ‘‘ a proper exercise of the police power ” and cites the 
License cases, 5¢ Howard. The phrase police power occurs in 
briefs and arguments of cases in the state courts a few times prior 
to that, notably in those of Massachusetts and Michigan. 
Judge Trumbull transfers it evidently with precisely the meaning 
broadly attached to it in the federal cases, as by Justice Barbour in 
New York zs. Miln, and by all the others who used it in the License 
and the Passenger cases—the sense in which Judge Wayne declares 
it was always used in the argument in the latter cases. This is its 
‘national’’ as opposed to its ‘‘local’’ sense, the sense in which 
Judge Marshall first employed it. For Judge Trumbull, as for the 
judges from whom he took it, it means the remaining powers of the 
state after giving to the general government its authority and set- 
ting aside such ordinary powers as by constant use have required a 
separate identity and a definite name, as ‘‘ taxation,’’ ‘‘ eminent do- 
main,’’ ‘‘ administration of justice,” etc. 
That it was by him or by any judge up to the time now reached, 
1852, confined to cases of overwhelming necessity, such as had 
been in England held to relieve officers from accountability for 
damages to individuals for which otherwise they would be liable, is 
clearly not true. Overwhelming necessity might conceivably call 
for the forbidding of sales of spirituous liquors or even for their 
destruction, as was held in the case of “Jones vs. Richmond in a 
117710. 196, 218 Gratt., 517. 
