1900.] HASTINGS—POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. 493 
make mention of ‘‘ postal power’’ in ex parte Jackson. It is diffi- 
cult to see why they might not as well do that as discuss a 
‘“commercial power,’’ a term which has been well known in the 
opinions of the court, at least ever since Justice McLean’s discus- 
sion of the passenger cases. 
At this same important session, too, the power of the ‘state was 
relieved from what threatened to be a severe restriction in the con- 
struction of the term due process of law. In 1879 the people 
of California had adopted a constitution providing that prosecutions 
for crime might be by information instead of by indictment or pre- 
sentment ofa grand jury. May 7, 1882, Hurtado had been convicted 
of murder in Sacramento county, California, on information for that 
crime without any investigation or presentment by a grand jury. 
It was claimed on his behalf that such a conviction was not due 
process of law. The Supreme Court of the state, however, found 
that it was, and on error to the federal Supreme Court it was af- 
firmed. Justice Matthews holds that the provision did not require 
presentment by a grand jury and due process of law as meant by 
the constitution cannot be given the effect of requiring the states 
to abide by the legal procedure in vogue at its adoption if the sub- 
stitute is one which accords with legal principles and the needs of 
justice. 
In the same term the *slaughter-house cases came up in a new 
form. ‘The legislature of Louisiana had repealed the franchise 
which had been held good in those cases. The holders of it claimed 
that this was an impairment of the obligation of a contract as 
their charter under which they had expended considerable sums of 
money, gave them an exclusive franchise to maintain stock yards 
and slaughter-houses for the city of New Orleans for a number of 
years. When the Butchers’ Union Company were about to take 
advantage of the repeal and engage in the business the Crescent 
City Company procured from the federal Circuit Court an injunc- 
tion against their doing so on the ground that the repeal of the ex- 
clusive franchise of the Crescent City Company was in violation of 
the federal constitution as impairing the obligation of a contract. 
Judge Miller again rendered the opinion and this judge who in 
’Loan Association vs. Topeka had declared that the executive, leg- 
1 Hurtado vs. Cal., 770 U. S., 516 (1884). 
2 Butchers’ Union & Co. ws. Crescent City & Co., 777 U. S., 746. 
3 20 Wall., 635. 
