o1-t HASTINGS—POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. [June 19, 
there used as a beverage and for other purposes than for mechanical, 
medicinal, culinary and sacramental purposes, contrary to the statutes 
of Iowa.” 
Kidd answered that he held a license to manufacture and sell 
intoxicants, except as by law prohibited, and had at all times com- 
plied with the law. 
At the trial it appeared that no sales were made in the state of 
Towa; that all the liquors were for exportation and were sold out- 
side of the state. A decree was entered abating the distillery as a 
nuisance and enjoining any further manufacture of intoxicating 
liquors in it. This decree having been affirmed by the Iowa Su- 
preme Court, a writ of error was obtained from Washington. The 
state court had held that the statute had permitted the sale of 
imported liquors in the original packages, but that intoxicating 
liquors might be made in the state only for the purposes allowed by 
the law, and transportation and sale beyond the state was not among 
them, and that as thus construed the law did not conflict with the 
federal constitution. 
The federai court found two questions in the case: 
First. Did the statute so construed conflict with the commerce 
clause of the federal constitution ? : 
Second. Was it in violation of the fourteenth amendment as 
depriving of property without due process of law? The last ques- 
tion is held to be disposed of by the case of Mugler vs. Kansas. 
The other question is elaborately discussed by Justice Lamar, 
though he declined to admit there was any difficulty in the case. 
His proposition is that no power of Congress may attach to that 
which has no lawful existence in the state; it having been held 
that the state may without infringing on the liberty of its citizens 
forbid the manufacture, and having done so that disposes of the 
matter and there is no question of commerce concerned. 
The contest in Coe vs. Errol between the taxing power of the 
state and the commerce clause and the opinion of Justice Bradley 
in that case are referred to with the remark that the police power 
of a state is as full and plenary as the taxing power. 
The insufficiency of logic in this matter to establish a practical 
rule has never been better shown than by a comparison of this case 
with that of *Bowman gs. C. & N. W. Ry. Co. The police power 
SAMS (CE, Soo 5 7c 2125) Ch Sis 405. 
