1900] HASTINGS—POLICE POWER OF THE STATE, 517 
The application set forth the proceedings; that the former rate 
was unreasonable and excessive, and more than was charged else- 
where in the state for like service, and unjust discrimination. An 
alternative writ was issued, and a return made by the company that 
neither legislature nor commission had authority to fix rates; 
that the owners of the road alone had such authority, and the 
attempt of the commission to do so was taking property without 
due process of law. 
It claimed that its own rates were reasonable, and any attempt to 
reduce them would deprive it of reasonable compensation for its 
service. At the hearing the company asked for a reference to take 
testimony as to the reasonableness of its charges. ‘This was refused, 
and a peremptory writ of mandamus issued establishing the rates 
fixed by the commission and awarding costs against the company. 
The case was taken to the federal Supreme Court. ‘The state 
court had construed the statute to mean that the commission’s rates 
were final—not advisory nor prima facie reasonable, but conclusive 
—and held the act valid on such construction. 
The railway contended that it held by charter the right to make 
its own rates of toll. The federal court, however, held that the 
charter rights of the company were all held subject to any valid 
legislation of the state. 
As to the claim, also made by the company, that the acts of the 
commission were an unconstitutional deprivation of property with- 
out due process of law, the court held itself bound by the con- 
struction of the statute made by the state court, that the orders of 
the commission were final and conclusive if the law was valid, and 
says: 
‘It deprives the company of its right to an investigation by due process 
of law under the form and with the machinery provided by the wisdom 
of successive ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of the 
matter in controversy, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, 
the action of a railroad commission, which, in view of the powers con- 
ceded to it by the state court, cannot be regarded as clothed with 
judicial functions or possessing the machinery of a court of justice.” 
... ‘©The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for trans- 
portation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of 
reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, 
is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process 
of law for its determination.”’ 
