120 Timehri. 



began his opening address in the case for the prosecution against the 

 accused who were then represented by counsel as follows : — 



Sewdin \ 



S° Mr - E - G - w ° oiford - 



Surjoo J 



Mahadeo Mr. C. R. Browne. 



Buckreedee Mr. B. B. Marshall. 



Joseph Paul | Mr McArthur . 



James Lewis J 



The address lasted for half-a-day and was not concluded when His 

 Honour at 1 p.m. adjourned the hearing until 9 a.m. next day. 



Abrupt Ending of Trial. 



On His Honour the Chief Justice, Sir Charles Major, Kt., resuming 

 his seat on the Bench next morning, he addressed the jury as follows : — 



Gentlemen of the Jury, — The sitting of the Court has been tempo- 

 rarily delayed this morning in order that a conference should be held 

 in my Chambers with the learned Attorney General, the learned 

 Solicitor General, and learned counsel representing the prisoners. After 

 hearing what has been said by all persons at that Conference, and 

 without entering into the reasons for the action I propose to take, and I 

 refrain from entering into them at the express desire of learned counsel 

 for the prisoners, I propose to exercise the discretion which is vested in 

 me by law and take action under the section of the Indictable Offences 

 Procedure Ordinance which enacts : — 



" The Court may in its discretion in a case of any emergency or 

 casualty rendering it in its opinion expedient for the ends of justice to 

 do so, discharge a jury without their giving a verdict and direct a new 

 jury to be empanelled during the same sitting of the Court, or may 

 postpone the trial on such terms as justice may require." 



Postponement of Trial Expedient. 



" The section contemplates the existence of an emergency which 

 renders it expedient in the interests of Justice that the jury should be 

 discharged in the first instance and then it leaves it open to the Court 

 either to empanel a new jury at once, or to postpone the trial on such 

 terms as justice may require. I propose for the reasons I have stated in 

 brief to discharge you without giving a verdict, an emergency having 

 arisen in my opinion, which renders it expedient in the interests of 

 justice that that should be done, and following upon that, inasmuch as we 

 are now approaching the end of the present legal term, and the trial is 

 likely to last much longer than the time remaining at our disposal, to 

 postpone the trial until the next sitting of this Court in the ordinary 

 course of business, that is to say, on the 1st October next. The 



