766 REPORT— 1895. 



man' of popular description, whether or not he occupy a place in economic theory, 

 is no portrait of the economist of actual historical fact. The name of ' dismal 

 science,' so often misapplied, was suggested not so much by the suppression of 

 human interest as by the apparent destruction of cherished hopes. The science 

 was ' dismal,' not, as popular usage interprets the phrase, because it was dry and 

 uninteresting, but because it seemed to counsel despair ; and even then the title 

 partook of caricature. 



Nor do I think that in this connection an attitude of strict neutrality is desirable, 

 if it be possible. The besetting sin of the academic temper is indecision, and 

 few errors are more mischievous in practical affairs. An obstinate regard for 

 neutrality may easily beget indecision, and from that moment the economist 

 becomes ineffectual for practice. I must confess to the belief tliat the practical 

 man has a right to demand an opinion on economic points from the academic 

 professor, and that the professor has a claim to take part in the guidance of 

 economic affairs which is derived from his scientific study. Pie is an expert, and 

 it is no less his duty than his privilege to discharge an expert's functions. He 

 cannot, as it seems to me, properlj- evade the one or abnegate the other. He may 

 be careful in forming his judgment. He may conscientiously endeavour to assign 

 its due weight to every circumstance. He may remember and insist that in many 

 practical problems other aspects besides the economic must be considered. But the 

 economic is often of great, and sometimes of par:imount, importance ; and on this 

 he cannot disown the responsibility of making up his mind without, as it seems to 

 me, forfeiting his own self-respect and his nsefulness to others. From that 

 moment his neutrality vanishes. He may, and probably will, incur an opprobrium 

 which he might have avoided by a refusal to adopt a decisive opinion. He may 

 sacrifice a quiet and ease wJiich he might have retained. But, whether our aim be 

 the correct conduct of affairs or the due recognition of economic science, I cannot 

 doubt that he has chosen the better part. To insist on a strict neutrality for 

 economists in matters of practice seems to me idle and misleading. It is idle, 

 because the economist is human, and economics is concerned with some of the 

 most important interests of human welfare. It is misleading, because it is the duty 

 of the economic expert to offer guidance on economic points, and there are at all 

 times few practical questions which do not present an economic side. Certainly 

 at the present juncture, when the pressing problems of the hour are in many cases 

 distinctly and admittedly economic in character, to attempt a divorce between 

 theory and practice is especially inopportune. It is an impossible endeavour to 

 saw a man into separate quantities ; and I would claim for the appropriate 

 description of every great economist the epitaph on the tomb of the German 

 socialist, ' Ferdinand Lassalle, thinker and fighter.' We need not abandon the 

 thought, but it should stimulate, and not paralyse, the action; for the one is not 

 fully complete until it is realised in the other. Economics is indeed a science, and 

 on that ground claims a recognised place in the programme of this Association ; 

 but it is essentially, as I think, an applied, and not a pure, science, and the 

 economist has only fulfilled part of his mission when he has solved a speculative 

 problem. I am aware that this contention may not be admitted by many academic 

 professors and practical men, but I believe that it is in accord with historical 

 tradition, and admits of logical justification. 



Yet, if an attitude of strict neutrality be impossible and ineffective, the opposite 

 extreme of dogmatic assertion is as undesirable as it is dangerous. The older 

 economists have been often charged with an error of this nature ; and it cannot be 

 denied that the accusation rests on a basis of truth, though it has sometimes been 

 couched in exaggerated form. Certainly the modern economist is inclined to state 

 his opinion with less assurance ; and for that very reason he has lost some of his 

 iniluence on practical affairs. For the practical man has a sneaking affection, and 

 even respect, for dogmatic assertion. At any rate, he desires a plain, direct, and 

 concise answer to his questions, and it is not easy to distinguish between an avoid- 

 ance of dogmatism and an appearance of indecision. Nor can it be denied that, as 

 a discipline of the mind, a study of the more abstract reasonings of some of the 

 older writers, which generally presented the semblance, and sometimes offered the 



