TRANSACTIONS OF SECTION F. 769 



removiDg unnecessary hindrance, ani furnisliinof likely assistance, to a pacific 

 flg-reement. And, whatever the final consequences of a dispute to the interests oi 

 eitlier party, the existence of friction and irritation is beyond question an injury 

 and hindrance to production. The loss thus occasioned is immediate as well as 

 distant, and may be considerable; but, if the telescope of the economist is gene- 

 rally needed to bring sulhciently close the ultimate effects of industrial disputes, 

 his microscope is sometimes required to magnify the results of friction to dimen- 

 sions which will attract and retain tlie attention of the oidinary observer. By 

 discovering these deeper considerations beneath the superficial appearance of 

 affairs economics may furnish useful guidance iu tlie prevention and adjustment 

 of industrial disputes. 



For to what conclusion do these considerations lead ? To the discovery of 

 some machinery which may prove not unacceptable, and yet, by imposing delay on 

 the outbreak of strife, may allow the two parties to hear what either has to urge, 

 and t3 consider the possible consequences of the action they are proposing to take. 

 Such a machinery may be discovered in boards of conciliation and courts of arbi- 

 tration. The fact that both sides should be organised on a sufficiently responsible 

 basis to send accredited representatives: the fact that, thus meeting one another, 

 they are compelled to seek and adduce reasons for their own position and to 

 listen to the arguments in support of their opponents ; the fact that delay and 

 deliberation ai"e recognised preliminaries to the commencement of war — these facts 

 may not appear important in themselves, but they oftt;r a chance of pacific adjust- 

 ment, and afford opportunity for the consideration of ulterior issues. They prevent 

 the apparent interests of the moment from winning an undisputed victory over the 

 less obvious interests of the future ; and they do not allow an advantage in distri- 

 bution to be secured without thought of the efi'ects on production. On the other 

 hand, the antagonism of interests incident to the distribution of wealth, when the 

 production is regarded as a given quantity, suggests that the raachineiy may on 

 occasions break down, and that the arrangements should properly consist of different 

 stages and provide supplementary resources ; for arbitration may succeed in ad- 

 justing a dispute to which conciliation has proved incompetent, and conciliation 

 may conceivably be useful where arbitration lias been ineffectually tried. Such 

 antagonism also suggests that voluntary adhesion is likely to be more abiding than 

 compulsion, and more conducive to the permanent interests of peace, and that to 

 prevent the occurrence, or reduce the lilielihood, of industrial conflict a traditional 

 standard of settlement, changed in grave emergencies or serious vicissitudes alone,, 

 should be established in the trade and recognised as fair. 



For economics, as it seems to me, can do little more than point out those 

 ultimate and obscure consequences which are concealed by immediate superficial 

 appearances ; and it is not in possession of a precise principle or rule, which can be- 

 definitely applied to the determination of industrial disputes. Could it, indeed, 

 furnish such a rule, the argument in favour of the legal bestowal of compulsory 

 powers on courts of arbitration and boards of conciliation would gain considerable 

 strength ; for it must be remembered that the questions before them are not the 

 interpretation of past contracts, stich as are habitually submitted to the Continental 

 Conseils de Prud'hommes, but the establishment of agreements for the future, and 

 it is difficult to force parties to agree when you do not supply a principle of agree- 

 ment, nor does it on the whole seem likely to conduce to conciliatory relations to 

 declare that, while you will not compel ma.sters and men to agree, you will 

 compel them to abide at all hazards by the agreement to which they may come. 

 For these reasons, tempting as it undoubtedly is to invoke legal compulsion, I believe 

 that the State can do little more than supply facilities for voluntary agreement 

 and, exercising, perhaps, some gentle persuasion, leave the pressure of public opinioa 

 to induce recourse to machinery thus provided. Such I take to be the drift of 

 competent experienced opinion and the probable scope of effective legislation ; and 

 such, as it seems to me, is the kind of guidance which economics can offer on this 

 practical question. 



II. In a town like Ipswich we are forcibly reminded of another question of the 

 day — I mean agricultural depression. From the Reports of the Assistant-Cooi- 



1895. 3 D 



