444 



But the '"type" says Dr. Dahl plays a far more important part 

 in nearly all the sciences and is understood to be "the fundamen- 

 tal form of a group of.things". This form "exists only in a trans- 

 cendental sense, not in reality but only in our minds, and it is custom- 

 ary to choose out from that group an example which most nearly 

 approaches this fundamental form". — And this species we are to 

 regard as the type. 



Now I have no intention at present of entering into subtle argu- 

 ments as to the nature of the ultimate Type in Itself, and when an 

 author chooses out an example from a group, it does not matter to me 

 by what metaphysical considerations he fixes upon this or that species 

 to represent the form which did not exist in reality, so long as he 

 selects one which does exist in reality, namely one of the species 

 originally referred to the genus. 



This species Dahl regards as the type, and one would ask why, 

 when the original author at any time cites a species as type, this 

 species is not to be regarded as that which more nearly approaches 

 the fundamental form he had in his mind? And why then are not 

 Latreille's citations in 1810 so to be regarded? 



When however the original generic group has been broken up 

 before a type has been cited, then if the original author wishes to 

 cite the type, he has to confine himself to the remainder, and from 

 these to select the one which more nearly approaches his ideal type 

 form. So too with a later author. And what is this citation of a type 

 but the limitation of the genus, originally allowable, as it then exists? 

 The action is for practical purposes exceedingly advantageous because 

 it definitely attaches the generic name to a single species which serves 

 as "type" or standard of comparison. 



For in practical systematics, as in every other science with which 

 I can acquainted, a type is always used in the sense of a standard of 

 comparison by which we may know the characteristics of any group 

 of phenomena referred to, and classify then accordingly. 



Whatever subtle differences then may be in the senses in which 

 the term is used; in actual practice, whether used in a Biblical, Medi- 

 cal, Architectural or Phylogenese or any other sense, the type always 

 carries with it the idea of a standard, a fixed and definite form with 

 which we may compare others and so determine their affinities. But 

 whether or no, at present we are engaged in systematic zoology and 

 not in Biblical exegesis, and for us a type is used in the sense of a 

 standard of comparison, either for a single species or for a generic 

 group, so that we may compare our material with it and decide with 

 which group it has the strongest affinities. Of what earthly value 



