544 TRANSACTIONS OF SECTION F. 
The following Papers were then read :— 
1. Federal Government. 
By the Right Hon. Herserr Samuet, M.A., M.P. 
The principle of federation has made great strides in the modern world. 
Almost half the populations belonging to the white races live under federal 
constitutions. The division of powers between the central and the provincial 
authorities shows great diversity, but the common feature, which is the 
defining mark of all federations, is the co-existence of a central authority, 
acting on behalf of the whole State in external affairs and in such internal 
affairs as are held to be of common interest, and of local authorities with con- 
siderable powers of legislation and administration. 
For centuries the movements of constitutional change have been in the main 
towards greater centralisation. The conclusion ‘is often drawn that the natural 
evolution of States is in that direction, and that any tendency to create, or even 
to retain, powerful provincial institutions is retrograde. But this is a false 
generalisation. The vast area of many modern communities would often make 
centralisation injurious if not impossible. To abolish the local Legislatures 
of the United States, for example, would not be a measure of progress. The 
continued existence of the British Empire has only been possible through the 
decentralisation of its government. Considerations of local patriotism also 
enter. Germany, with twenty-five Legislatures, is not weaker than France with 
only one, and would not be made stronger if she attempted to suppress the 
autonomous institutions of her component States. When a number of small 
States federate they show no tendency to carry centralisation further and to 
amalgamate. 
British statesmanship has to consider the needs both of the United Kingdom 
and of the Empire. The Constitution of the United Kingdom is neither 
federal nor unitary. There are separate judiciaries in England with Wales, 
in Scotland, and in Ireland, the House of Lords having the characteristics of a 
federal court of appeal. The executive also is largely decentralised ; Scotland 
and Ireland have their own Ministers; and of the fifteen Cabinet Ministers 
who deal with domestic affairs only four exercise functions over the whole of 
the United Kingdom. The Legislature is in the main unitary, but shows several 
traces of federalism. The legislation which it passes is largely decentralised, 
nearly one-half of the statutes applying only to parts of the United Kingdom. 
How far these conditions are satisfactory is too much a question of controversy 
to be discussed here, but there are reasons for holding that the Constitution 
of the United Kingdom is over-centralised, and should properly develop in a 
federal direction. 
The Constitution of the British Empire, on the other hand, is clearly under- 
centralised. The only organs which serve equally all parts of the Empire are 
the Monarchy, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the Imperial 
Conference. The Committee of Imperial Defence may develop into another. 
But the populations of the outlying parts of the Empire have no formal share 
in its sovereignty. It is unlikely that this can be the final shape of the 
Empire’s Constitution, but the creation of any federal institutions with execu- 
tive and legislative powers is a task surrounded by formidable difficulties. It 
may be that, as a stage in development, there will be formed a federal union 
between Governments, such as existed in Switzerland, in the United States, 
and in Germany at certain periods in their histories, the central authority 
having no direct relation with the citizens of the component States. However 
this may be, it is clear that systems of greater elaboration must be devised to 
meet the complexity of the problems both of the United Kingdom and of the 
Empire, and in this development the principles and methods of federalism must 
play a leading part. 
