648 TRANSACTIONS OF SECTION I. se 
point he is a person, the subject of purposive knowledge and volition. The man 
as mere physical body or organism is an evident fiction or abstraction from 
reality, though a very'necessary one for our imperfect knowledge. As a con- 
scious individual personality he is at least far less of a fiction. But we can often 
get no further than a physical or physiological account of reality; and for this 
reason the physical or physiological account of man can never be dispensed with. 
The physical sciences, biology, and psychology, go on their several ways, 
accumulating knowledge which each science interprets according to its own 
working hypothesis and subject to the limitations due to the abstractions from 
reality which are involved in these hypotheses. Each lower science also hands 
on what is, relatively speaking, raw material to the higher one. The attempt 
to resolve the higher into the lower, as by making mind dependent on body, is 
foredoomed to failure. The corresponding attempt to resolve the lower into 
the higher, as by making body dependent on mind, is also impossible; for the 
knowledge which would justify such an attempt is lacking, even were such know- 
ledge conceivable. 
It seems to me that it is only by this general conception of the relation of 
physical and physiological to psychological knowledge that each science can gain 
for itself a clear field of operation, and escape from the confusion which results 
from wrongly applying scientific hypotheses to what lies outside their scope. 
In practical life we draw no such distinctions; for we use every scrap of know- 
ledge we possess, however partial or mutually contradictory these scraps may 
be. We live and move in a world of apparent contradictions, within which 
science, religion, and philosophy afford us only a general guidance. In this 
practical life the question of the relation of body to mind comes up in a piece- 
meal form, and can only be answered in a similar fashion, as it is answered 
every day in practical medicine, where we sometimes regard the body as 
dominating the mind, and sometimes the mind as dominating the body. Such 
answers are, however, not those of science or philosophy. We cannot generalise 
from them; and the attempt to do so leads only to confusion. 
(iv) From the Standpoint of Psychology. By H. J. Wart, Ph.D. 
The scientific problems concerning the connection between body and mind 
grow out of the interdependence of the two, which we all learn to recognise, not 
merely by reflection, but also by virtue of the diverse behaviour of experiences 
essentially identical or parallel, e.g. sensations and images. In the physical 
scienves uniform and more or less consistent schemes of arrangement and inter- 
connection of elements and other units have been adopted. But no general 
hypothesis of psychical structure has yet been established. Any considerable 
advance in the study of the relations of body and mind must therefore be 
made from the side of psychological science. 
The connection between body and mind must rest upon some form of correla- 
tion between the realms of ‘material’ and ‘ psychical’ things, in so far as it is 
agreed that some or all psychical processes are accompanied by, or are evoked by, 
physical processes or wice versa. The scope of this correlation cannot well be 
explored from the physical side, as obviously not all physical processes and all 
aspects thereof have a discoverable psychical counterpart. The task for 
psychology is, then, to form an exhaustive list of psychical states, whether 
elements, compounds, or other derivatives, and to ask for each of these and each 
distinguishable aspect thereof whether some satisfactory correlative cannot be 
found among known or possible physical processes and their predicable asnects. 
Such a psychological analysis has’ been involved in every theory of the relation 
between body and mind. An attempt to reduce the scope of correlation by a 
proof that the unitary nature of psychical processes has no physical counterpart 
will be considered. Allowing for mind not only the rule of the identity of 
indiscernibles, but also the integration of limited differences within partial 
identity according to specific rules to be discovered. we need not invoke the soul 
or any other psychical agent in order to explain these rules, any more than in 
physical science we need assume the presence of ‘forces’ to explain physical laws. 
