28 
dialogues as one body animated by one soul, as a harmonious 
whole, pervaded in all its parts by a central unity of purpose 
governing the whole. 
Mr Cope then proceeds to state the professed object of the 
Theetetus: viz. the determination of the nature and character-. 
istic distinctions of knowledge as compared with other modes of 
apprehension belonging to the human intellect, namely, sensa- 
tion or sensible perception; opinion or belief, dofa or adyO7s 
Sé£a; or this accompanied by Adyos. He considers it to be the 
first serious attempt at a psychological analysis of the faculties or 
modes of apprehension of the mind, of which it suggests that 
there are three, sensation, belief, knowledge. 
Mr Cope maintains that the question involved in this discus- 
sion of the Protagorean dictum ‘zavtwy pétpov avOpwmos’ is no 
mere dialectical encounter of wits, but one of the highest interest, 
namely, “Is there any such thing as truth? if so what is it? is 
there any standard of truth and knowledge independent of our- 
selves our own feelings and momentary consciousness?” 
Mr Cope then proceeds to consider the following questions: 
(1) Has Plato misrepresented Protagoras’ theory? 
(2) Has he refuted it, or is it really true as Mr Grote 
holds it to be when properly interpreted? 
(1) Mr Cope argues against the probability of Plato having 
misrepresented Protagoras’ theory either wilfully or through ig- 
norance, by a close examination of the discussion in the Theeete- 
tus; and further brings forward evidence from Aristotle, Diogenes 
Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, and Simplicius, to prove that he has 
not done so. Mr Cope then shews, from an examination of the 
sense in which words expressive of mental faculties or processes 
are used in the Theetetus, that there is an a priord probability 
that Protagoras was ignorant of any distinction between sen- 
sation and thought or knowledge; and therefore confined his 
theory of the subjective standard of truth to the apprehension of 
objects by sensation. 
