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PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS, 9 
most superficial layers of observed phenomena, I would put the 
distinction between the two attitudes of mind in this way: One 
glorifies our ignorance, while the other accepts it as a regrettable 
necessity.’ 
With this criticism I am in accord. 
In further illustration of the modern sceptical attitude, I quote from 
Poincaré :— 
‘ Principles are conventions and definitions in disguise. They 
are, however, deduced from experimental laws, and these latws 
have, so to speak, been erected into principles to which our mind 
attributes an absolute value.’ 
‘The fundamental propositions of geometry, for instance 
Euclid’s postulate, are only conventions; and it is quite as un- 
reasonable to ask if they are true or false as to ask if the metric 
system is true or false. Only, these conventions are con- 
venient.’ won 
‘ Whether the ether exists or not matters little,—let us leave 
that to the metaphysicians; what is essential for us is that every- 
thing happens as if it existed, and that this hypothesis is found 
to be suitable for the explanation of phenomena. After all, have 
we any other reason for believing in the existence of material 
objects? That, too, is only a convenient hypothesis.’ 
A needed antidote against over-pressing these utterances, however, 
is provided by Sir J. Larmor in his Preface :— 
‘ There has been of late a growing trend of opinion, prompted 
in part by general philosophical views, in the direction that the 
theoretical constructions of physical science are largely facti- 
tious, that instead of presenting a valid image of the relations of 
things on which forther progress can be based, they are still little 
better than a mirage.’ : 
“The best method of ahanie this scepticism is to become 
acquainted with the real scope and modes of application of con- 
ceptions which, in the popular language of superficial exposition— 
and even in the unguarded and playful paradox of their authors, 
intended only for the instructed eye—often look bizarre enough.’ 
One thing is very notable, that it is closer and more exact know- 
ledge that has led to the kind of scientific scepticism now referred to; 
and that the simple laws on which we used to be working were thus 
simple and discoverable because the full complexity of existence was 
tempered to our ken by the roughness of our means of observation. 
Kepler’s laws are not accurately true, and if he had had before him 
all the data now available he could hardly have discovered them. A 
