president's address. 21 



tion. It is no argument against my definition of the objects of 

 science, that a large section of its subdivisions has been, and to some 

 extent still is, mainly occupied with the discovery and classification of 

 facts; because such classification can only be a first step, preparing the 

 way for a correlation into which the element of time must enter, and 

 which therefore ultimately must depend either on history or prophecy. 



Latterly men of science, and in particular physicists, have given 

 increased attention to the intrinsic meaning of the concepts by means 

 of which we express the facts of Nature. Everything — who can deny 

 it?- -is ultimately reduced to sense impressions, and it has therefore 

 been asserted that science is the study of the mind rather than of the 

 outside world, the very existence of which may be denied. The 

 physicist has thus invaded the realm of philosophy and metaphysics, 

 and even claims that kingdom as his own. Two effects of these efforts, 

 a paralyzing pessimism and an obscure vagueness of expression, if not 

 of thought, seriously threatened a few years ago to retard the healthy 

 progress of the study of Nature. If the outside world were only a dream, 

 if we never could know what really lies behind it, the incentive which 

 has moved those whose names stand out as landmarks in science is 

 destroyed, and it is replaced by what? By a formula which only 

 appeals to a few spirits entirely detached from the world in which they 

 live. Metaphysicians and physicists will continue to look upon science 

 from different points of view, and need not resent mutual criticisms of 

 each other's methods or conclusions. For we must remember that 

 most of the good that is done in this world is done by meddling with 

 other people's affairs, and though the interference is always irritating 

 and frequently futile, it proves after all that our interests converge 

 towards a common centre. 



According to Poincar^, the pleasure which the study of science 

 confers consists in its power of uniting the beautiful with the useful; 

 but it would be wrong to adopt this formula as a definition of the object 

 of science, because it applies with equal force to all human studies. 

 [ go further, and say that the combination of the search for the beauti- 

 ful with the achievement of the useful is the common interest of science 

 and humanity. Some of us may tend more in one direction, some in 

 another, but there must always remain a feeling of imperfection and 

 only partial satisfaction unless we can unite the two fundamental 

 desires of human nature. 



I have warned you at the beginning of this discourse not to beat 

 the utilitarian drum too loudly, and I have laid stress throughout on 

 the idealistic side, though the most compelling events of the moment 

 seem to drive us in the other direction, and the near future will press 

 the needs of material prosperity strongly upon us. I must guard 



