478 Scientific Proceedings, Royal Dublin Society. 



Part II. — Outline of the Argument. 



1. Man is concerned with what may be provisionally regarded 

 as two kinds of auta (ra ovra avra, real existences), viz. egoistic 

 auta and sense-compelling auta. (Essay, p. 488.) 



2. Definition. — By egoistic auta are to be understood the 

 thoughts that are my own mind, and those which are the minds of 

 my fellow-men and of other animals. See Postulates 1, 2, 4, and 

 Definitions 1 and 2. (Essay, p. 489). 



3. Definition. — By sense-compelling auta are to be under- 

 stood the sources of my perceptions, which by Postulate 5 are auta 

 which are not within the little group of auta constituting my 

 mind. (Essay, p. 489.) 



4. Definition.— Tl^a wt«s^ — — --^ 



* ^xolouuc — an auto, or rather a group of associated auta — 



which, as the result of one branch of its activity, can produce in us 

 the various perceptions that when built together constitute the 

 phenomenal object usually called the brain. This onto-brain is 

 more than the mind. (Foot-note, p. 492.) What more there is in it 

 may be appropriately called the synergos — (jwepyog, a fellow- 

 labourer — because (along with other activities) it renders help to 

 the mind. Accordingly the onto-brain (of a man who is alive and 

 awake) consists of — 



1. The mind. 



2. The synergos. 



Similarly, if the rest of the onto-body of a man be called the 

 doulos (SovAoc, a servant), the entire of the onto-man — the really 



