490 Scientific Proceedings, Royal Dublin Society. 



sense-compelling universe, and of the thoughts of men and animals. 

 This division is convenient, although faulty from a logical point of 

 view, since we shall find that the parts of which it consists overlap. 

 We shall, nevertheless, make use of the distinction provisionally 

 for the sake of its convenience. 



Now, when I open my eyes or exercise any of my other senses, 

 sense-compelling auta transmit messages to me through my senses. 

 These messages present themselves as parts of my mind, of my 

 group of thoughts ; and, in the actual form in which they arise 

 within my mind, I propose to call them tekmeria — signs 

 within my mind that events are happening in a part of the 

 universe that is distinct from my mind. Thus, when I look 

 towards the fire in the room in which I sit, the actual existence, 

 the sense-compelling auto, which for distinctness sake we may 

 call the onto-fire, 1 [to. ovra, things which actually exist), trans- 

 mits one message or signal to me through my eyes, viz. the visual 

 appearance of the fire. This is one tekmerion made to be a part 

 of my mind by the onto-fire so long as it is acting upon me. 

 When, at the same time, I hold out my hands, it transmits a 

 second message to me, the perception of warmth, through another 

 of my senses. And it sends another tekmerion to me, another 

 witness that it is in existence and producing effects, through 

 my sense of hearing, viz. the sound of the flame playing over the 

 €oals. 



Thus, so long as I am employing my senses upon the fire, the 

 onto-fire, a cause which is distinct from my mind, i. e. which is not 

 a part of my little group of thoughts, is in three different ways, 

 and each of them a very indirect way, sending me what may well 



1 All names of objects, relations, events, or operations in nature are ambiguous, 

 and in some contexts mean tbe natural object, &c, and in otber contexts, that auto 

 or collections of auta in tbe sense- compelling universe, which is tbe aition or source 

 from which our perceptions come. See Diagram III., p. 486. (to cutiov, that part of 

 the entire body of causes leading up to tbe existence of a thing or of a group of things, 

 to which we may attribute tbe presence of that thing or group of things.) 



Tbe autic source of our perceptions, and tbe phenomenal object which is the out- 

 come of building tbe perceptions together, stand so much in contrast to one another, 

 that eacb might appropriately be called tbe antitbeton of the other. Of each pair of 

 antitbeta, one would then be a portion of tbe autic universe, the other an object of 

 nature. But in order to mark as emphatically as possible tbe distinction between 

 tbese, it is better to conflne tbe designation antitheton to the former of them, and to 

 speak of its correlative in the phenomenal world as its protheton. 



