512 Scientific Proceedings, Royal Dublin Society. 



my tiny group of auta, and it is only in these few cases that I can 

 have the process of causes producing effects under my inspection. 



But since cases can be cited, however few, they suffice to 

 establish the fact that the relation of cause and effect, in its full 

 sense, does exist in some instances in the autic universe ; whereas 

 it has nowhere any place within the domain of physical science. 

 I am even under the impression that every event which has 

 occurred in the real universe, every change that has taken place 

 there, has been, as a matter of fact, brought about by true, 

 adequate causes; although I am bound to admit that man lives 

 too secluded l from the rest of the universe, and with channels for 

 communicating with it that are far too indirect, for me to be 

 entitled to dogmatize and to say to myself or to my fellow-men 

 that I absolutely know this to be so. At the same time it 

 recommends itself to my mind as intrinsically probable ; and it is 

 besides supported by direct evidence which makes it probable in a 

 high degree — 



1°. Since there are some instances in which the whole 

 process of causation operating among auta can be observed. 



2°. Since no instance can be found in which observation is 

 possible, and in which it does not prevail ; and 



3°. Since the alternative supposition appears to be very 

 improbable. The only alternative is that, while the few 

 changes among auta which can be investigated are found to 

 be due to adequate causes, the rest which we cannot investi- 

 gate are uncaused. 

 The ontological inquiry on which we have entered may be 

 approached either in the sceptical or in the scientific frame of 

 mind. These are not only different but opposed. The motive 

 which rouses the scientific man to exertion is his earnest desire for 

 the increase of knowledge. For this he is willing to do his utmost 

 in any and every direction that is open to him. The motive 

 which controls the philosophical sceptic is his fear of a false step. 

 He is indisposed to stir at all until secure of his footing. The 

 mind when in a scientific attitude is patient even of known error, 

 if only it can be made the basis of a really good working hypo- 



1 According to Bacon, the mind of man is, as it were, a prisoner in a cave with his 

 hack to the light, who sees only shadows of the events passing outside. 



