250 REPORTS ON THE STATE OF SCIENCE.— 1916. 



of the campaign ; but we may very safely say that no such accidents 

 of topographical configuration would ever be selected as the basis of a 

 boundary in preference to the advantages conferred by an elevated line. 

 An open space of marshland, even if traversed by a definite river 

 channel in its midst, could not often occur in European configuration 

 as a useful alternative to the divide, so that I do not imagine that in 

 the redistribution of political boundaries at the close of the war, no 

 matter where they may take place, will there be any great departure 

 from the old order which adopted elevations and placed strong fortresses 

 at intervals to guard frontiers. Nothing has occurred which need shake 

 our faith in the value of this military precaution for the security of the 

 frontier. "Where the dividing line is unsupported by strong geo- 

 graphical features, such as are of themselves of military significance, 

 the construction of fortresses, wherein may be gathered large military 

 forces of sufficient strength to render it impossible to pass them by or 

 ignore them, will still be considered imperative. It was the strength 

 of the line of French forts from Belfort to Verdun facing the Vosges 

 Mountains and the Meuse which determined the initial strategy of 

 the GeiTTian campaign, and directed the advance through Belgium as 

 indicating the line of least resistance to Paris. It was the gallant 

 defence of Liege which destroyed the full effect of the great initiative 

 and gave priceless opportunity for mobilisation to the Allies. It is 

 the Bhineland fortresses, and not the Rhine itself, which will protect 

 the western frontiers of Germany when the hour comes for France to 

 strike back. The unexpect-ed collapse of Antwerp, of Namur, and 

 of Maubeuge does little to modify this opinion. I shall be surprised 

 if in the long future history does not point to the defence of Verdun 

 as the pivot on which the fortunes of the war turned. Along with 

 fortresses and with the controlling system of railways (with which we 

 cannot be concei-ned just now) there will be new developments on or 

 near the boundary which will be the outcome of present experiences. 

 The role of trench-digging and of earthworks, which is comparatively 

 new to European campaigning and which has time and time again 

 proved the one insuperable obstacle to rapid advance, will not be lost 

 sight of or neglected in favour of more impressive permanent works. 

 Boundaries will be selected that admit of the linking up of natural 

 features by a tracery of trenches and field works, infinitely intricate, 

 whilst artillery and all the mechanical paraphernaha of war with which 

 we have lately become familiar will find their place in the general 

 scheme. Indeed, it seems that the European boundary of the future 

 will be something more than the artificial impress of a line on the 

 face of Europe, having no further significance than that of a hedge. 

 It may well become an actual military barrier bristling with obstruction 

 and points of steel, so complete and effective in its appointments as 

 to approach very closely to realising an ideal of absolute security. Thus 

 will it really serve to diminish the probability of attack, and at any 

 rate to induce long and very careful consideration before its violation 

 is undertaken. It may be said that I am suggesting a defensive fence 

 round every State that has any consideration for its own security such 

 as might prove a serious bar to the exchange of friendly amenities. 



