TRANSACTIONS OP SECTION E. 227 



it alone oucupies racial homes ou each ocean. Consequently, before the national 

 army can be concentrated, parts ot it must be conveyed great distances by sea, 

 which can only be acnieveu m security it a supreme navy be inaintainea. Ail 

 oLi'er nations can concentrate their armies by railway, and therefore to none 

 ol tnem is a supreme navy essential, as it is to the British. A second peculiarity 

 of the British Empire is the inclusion of the vast Indian population, tor 

 each British subject tnere are in the world only three foreigners, a fact which 

 by, itself goes far to provide a humanitarian justification of that supreme navy 

 on which the continuance of the Empire depends. 



The geographical position of the Empire may appropriately be described 

 by reference to the ocean instead of the continents, since the communications 

 are maritime. The United Kingdom and the chief entrance to Canada are 

 on the Atlantic Ocean; South Atrica, India, and Australia are ranged round 

 the Indian Ocean, with Mew Zealand in the adjacent part of the Pacihc. 

 Thus the maintenance of naval communication extending halfway round the 

 world suffices, without the necessity for crossing the other half or the circuit, 

 which is comprised in the Pacific Ocean. The naval commmiications are, there- 

 fore, relatively siiort, and they are improved by an unrivalled selection of 

 intermediate narbours at natural junctions of maritime routes. The coastal 

 communications of Great Britain and the Colonial communications of the 

 Empire ara flanked by the territories of the French Kepublic much more 

 closely and extensively than by those of any other Great Power, in addition 

 to possessing good naval communications, the territories of a maritime State 

 should be dithcult of approach from the continental interiors. Tiiis condition 

 is fulfilled in the British Isles and Australasia by their insularity, in India 

 by a great, mountain barrier, in Egypt by deserts, and in South Africa by 

 remoteness and the barrier of tropical forest. In Canada alone, which has 

 restricted maritime access and a very open frontier, is there a marked dis- 

 cordance between geographical conditions and strategic requirements. The 

 neighbourhood of the British Empire and the American Republic is, however, 

 not confined to the common frontier, but is also to an important extent upon the 

 sea. This results from the dependence of the American Republic upon mari- 

 time commxmications for the maintenance of the Monroe policy, upon the out- 

 post of Panama, which is required for the maintenance of coastal communica- 

 tion, and upon the sea for almost all foreign commerce except that with 

 Canada itself. 



Australasia and India being nearer to Japan than to Great Britain the 

 strategic position is locally advantageous to the Japanese, but this is offset by 

 the great maritime superiority of the geographical position occupied by the 

 British Empire as a whole and the United Kingdom in particuiar. It should 

 also be noted that the security of maritime communication in general is an 

 important common interest of both States. 



Egypt not only provides the shortest naval connection between Great Britain 

 and India but the only route for the railway connection between our African 

 and Asiatic possessions. It is also at the junction of the air routes from 

 Great Britain to South Africa on the one hand and to India and Australasia ou 

 the other. Owing to the disruption of the Turkish Empire no one Government 

 now has power to provide protected communication from the Bosporus to the 

 Egyptian frontier, or to Mesopotamia, which is one of the approaches to 

 India both uia Persia and the Persian Gulf. 



Formerly the foreign policy of Russia and Germany so conflicted in refer- 

 ence to Constantinople that an entente was impossible. Now that this position 

 IS beyond the attainment of either, the advantages of alliance should be obvious 

 to both those nations. If possessing a common frontier, so that their com- 

 plementary reeources could be pooled without possibility of interference, they 

 would have all in the way of men and material requisite for a prolonged war 

 on the largest scale. At one end of then- combined territory railways reach 

 wie borderland of India, the most vulnerable portion of the British Empire. 

 The other end faces the most vital part of the Empire, Great Britain— the 

 chief recruiting base of white troops, the chief factory and shipyard. Germany 

 has excellent harbours within three hundred miles of Great Britain, and 

 adjoins the Low Countries, which provide in the harbours of the Rhine and 

 ^che!dt the best base from which to invade the citadel of our Empire. In 



