J.—PSYCHOLOGY. 145 
would have said ‘emergents’), which ‘ attempts to state the fact that 
in all psychical combinations the product is not a mere sum of the 
separate elements that compose such combinations, but that it repre- 
sents a new creation.’ Clearly there is here emergence. But Wundt 
_ accepted the philosophy of what may be distinguished as ‘ creative evo- 
lution ’—that which Professor Bergson in different form so brilliantly 
advocates. Wherein lies the difference? For M. Bergson the philo- 
sophical question is: What makes emergents emerge? Rightly or 
_ wrongly, I do not regard this question as one with which science, as 
_ such, is concerned ; and in some passages at any rate this is the opinion 
of M. Bergson himself. Philosophy, he says, ought to follow and 
: supplement : science, ‘ in order to superpose on scientific truth a know- 
ledge of another kind, which may be called metaphysical.’ Be that 
as it may, his answer to the question: What makes emergents 
emerge? is Mind or Spirit as Vital Impulsion. (I use capital letters 
_ for concepts of this order.) Whereas, then, for Mr. Alexander 
mind as consciousness is an empirical quality emergent in nature 
at an assignable stage of evolution, for M. Bergson Mind, as Spirit, is 
the metempirical Source (I adopt Lewes’s adjective) through the Agency 
of which emergent evolution has empirical being. For the one con- 
sciousness is a product of emergent evolution; for the other emergent 
evolution is the product of Spiritual Activity, which is sometimes spoken 
of as Consciousness. The methods of approach, the treatment, and 
_ the conclusions reached, are different. Although my present concern is 
with the former, this must not be taken to imply a denial of Spiritual 
Activity. Its discussion, however, belongs to a different universe of 
discourse. 
In Mind. 
To come to closer quarters with our sectional topic, what do we 
mean when we say that this or that is ‘in mind’? In a well-known 
passage Berkeley distinguished that which is in mind ‘ by way of 
attribute ’ from that which is in mind ‘ by way of idea.’ Fully realising 
that this should be read in the light of Berkeley’s adherence to the 
Creative concept, one may none the less claim for it validity on the 
empirical plane where mind is regarded as a product of emergent evolu- 
tion. The former, therefore (i.e. what is present in mind by way of 
attribute), I shall speak of as minding, the latter as that which is minded. 
The former is a character constitutive of the mind—that in virtue of 
which it is a mind; the latter as objective to the mind or for the mind. 
That which is minded always implies minding; but it does not neces- 
_ sarily fcllow that minding implies something minded. 
Let me name a few of the many cases in our own life where not only 
does the minded imply minding (which always holds good), but where 
minding implies something definitely minded (which often holds good). 
Perceiving implies something perceived; remembering, something re- 
embered ; imaging; lores = imaged ; thinking, something pene 
ms more or less definite “ed. Whether correlative to unconscious 
