146 SECLIONAL ADDRESSES. 
minding, there is something more or less definite which is unconsciously 
minded, it is very difficult to say. But if I do not misinterpret current 
opinion it is commonly held that something minded is often present to, 
or for, the unconscious mind. I shall say somewhat more on this 
head later on. 
The distinction based on that drawn by Berkeley may be expressed 
in another way. One may be said to be conscious in perceiving, re- 
membering, and, at large, minding; that which is perceived, remem- 
bered, or minded is what one is conscious of. I am conscious in 
attending to the rhythm or the thought of a poem; I am conscious of 
that to which I so attend. I need not then be conscious of attending to 
the poem, though perhaps I may, in psychological mood, subsequently 
make the preceding process of attention an object of thought. I am 
well aware that Professor Strong has urged that, in its original use, 
the expression ‘ conscious of’ was applied only with reference to mental 
process as such. One need not discuss this point. It must suffice to 
make clear the usage I accept. 
Even in our own life there are cases in which one’s consciousness 
im some experience—e.g. feeling fit or depressed—does not seem to 
have, correlative to it, anything definite of which one is conscious. It 
may, of course, be said that what one is here conscious of is some 
bodily condition, or some more abstract concept of welfare or the re- 
verse. But, without denying that it may come to be so interpreted in 
reflective thought, it is questionable whether the dog or the little child 
knows enough about ‘ the body ’ or of ‘ welfare ’ to justify us in regard- 
ing these as objectively minded. There can be little question, however, 
that the dog or the child (and we, too, in naive unreflective mood) may 
be conscious in such current episodes of daily life. Whether, therefore, 
there be something definitely minded or not, the emphasis is on minding 
(in a broad and comprehensive sense) as an inalienable attribute of that 
kind of being which we name ‘ mental.’ 
Mr. Alexander emphasises the distinction between what I have called 
the -ing and the -ed in the most drastic manner. He speaks of all that 
is in any way objective to minding as non-mental. I cannot follow his 
lead in this matter, because I need the word in what is for me (but 
not for him) a different sense. But what does he mean? It is pretty 
obvious that while seeing is a mental process in which I am conscious, 
the lamp that I see is not a mental process, but an object of which I 
am conscious. If, however, I picture the Corcovado beyond the waters 
of Rio Bay, is that mental? The picturing of a remembered scene is a 
mental process; but that which is thus pictured is not mental in the 
same sense. It is just as much re-presented for the remembering as 
the lamp is presented as an object for the seeing. And suppose I try 
to think of the four-dimensional space-time framework conceived by 
Minkowski; the thinking is unquestionably mental, but the framework 
thought of is not mental in the same sense. What is not mental in 
that sense Mr. Alexander calls ‘non-mental.’ I speak of that which 
is not mental in this sense as ‘ objective.’ 
A wider issue is here involved. Are we to include ‘in mind’ pro- 
cesses of minding only, or also that which is objectively given as 
